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Can Retributivism Be Saved?
Chad Flanders*
Retributive theory has long held pride of place among theories of
criminal punishment in both philosophy and in law. It has seemed, at
various times, either much more intuitive, or rationally persuasive, or
simply more normatively right than other theories. But retributive
theory is limited, both in theory and practice, and in many of its
versions is best conceived not as a theory of punishment in its own right,
but instead as shorthand for a set of constraints on the exercise of
punishment. Whether some version of retributive theory is a live
possibility in the contemporary world remains very much an
open question.
In my essay, I consider three interrelated lines of attack against
retributive theories of punishment: first, that it relies on philosophical
assumptions that are either unrealistic or false; second, that the notion
that offenders deserve to be punished, whatever its intuitive appeal, is
possibly an empty idea and in any case one unsuited to a politically
liberal state; and third, that the abstractness of most versions of
retribution render it unable to offer much in the way of useful or
concrete policy advice. If retributivism is to be taken seriously as a robust
theory of punishment, it needs to provide replies to each of these lines
of criticism.

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. Thanks to the faculty
at DePaul Law School for comments on a draft I presented to them, especially Susan Bandes,
David Franklin, Andrew Gold, Steven Resnicoff, Daniel Morales, and Allison Tirres. I have
certainly not answered all of their concerns. I am also grateful to William Baude, Christopher
Bradley, and Zach Hoskins for comments and conversations on earlier drafts. David Svolba
helped me think through early versions of the ideas presented here and Danny Priel gave me
numerous, detailed comments on a near-final draft. Vincent Chiao has influenced my thinking
away from retribution and toward a broader understanding of the criminal law. Finally, a
Chicago junior faculty workshop challenged me to make my argument clearer, and also much
more modest in its conclusions. Alex Muntges and Yiqing Wang provided excellent research
assistance. All errors are my responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Retribution is often taught as one of the major philosophies of
punishment, along with (prominently) deterrence and (less
prominently) rehabilitation. No major casebook omits at least a
cursory discussion of Immanuel Kant on retribution, or James
Fitzjames Stephen on revenge. 1 Retribution, no mere historical

1. One could cite almost any introductory criminal law casebook here, but Joshua
Dressler’s seems exemplary in the emphasis he gives to the philosophy of punishment,
including retribution. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 2012).
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artifact, has also enjoyed a tremendous theoretical resurgence in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries as more and more philosophers
and lawyers spend time articulating, defending, and elaborating
versions of retributivism. Several books published recently testify to
retributivism’s enduring prominence in the halls of the academy. 2
The so-called retributive revival in theory is here to stay, or so it seems.3
There is also good reason to believe that retributivism, in perhaps
a cruder and much less sophisticated form, has also been influential
at the practical level. The demand for uniformity in sentencing
reflects the idea that sentences should be roughly the same for all
offenders, which reflects the retributive ideas of proportionality and
just deserts. 4 More generally, the sentiments that wrongdoers should
be blamed or that wrongdoers deserve punishment are surely
retributive in nature. 5 We believe that when a crime has been
committed and prosecuted, punishment should be imposed
irrespective of whether this fully maximizes deterrence or
rehabilitates the offender.
But despite this seemingly overwhelming support, retributivism
faces serious challenges both in theory and practice. In theory,
retributivists have ignored or skated over what seems to be a major
(and almost decisive) flaw in their theory: they cannot give any

2. In just the past two years, two major collections of essays on retribution have
appeared. See RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY (Mark D. White ed., 2011);
RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST, DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE? (Michael Tonry ed., 2011)
[hereinafter Tonry, RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST]. White’s book is mostly essays in defense of
retribution; Tonry’s is more balanced. In addition, Michael Tonry has recently edited an
anthology of writings in philosophy of punishment, in which significant space is given to
retributive theories. See WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? 111–95 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011)
[hereinafter Tonry, WHY PUNISH?] (section on retributive theories of punishment).
3. For citations on the “retributive revival,” see Chad Flanders, Retribution and
Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 87 & n.1 (2010).
4. For a good overview of mandatory minimums in sentences, see Erik Luna & Paul
Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010); see also id. at 11 (connecting
mandatory minimums to retributive justifications for punishment). The classic defense of
uniformity in sentencing is MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973). See generally ANDREW VON HIRSH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) (defending the
strict retributive theory of punishment). For an excellent overview of “equality” in sentencing,
see James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 119 (2009).
5. See James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85
(2003). Jeffrie Murphy makes a more general defense of the so-called “retributive emotions”
(blame, hatred, resentment) in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY (1990).
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meaningful account of proportionality in punishment. 6 This has been
recognized before by scholars, but no retributivist has so far given an
entirely satisfactory answer to the basic question: how do we tell
exactly how much punishment offenders deserve? The fact that
retributivism places so much emphasis on proportionality (or
fairness) in punishment, but cannot offer much illumination about
what proportionality is—or how to achieve it—is a key insight that
something has gone wrong with retributive theory, even on its own
terms. Indeed, it suggests deeper problems about the very idea of
“deserved” punishment. Retribution has too easily been allowed to
“punt” on spelling out what proportionality in punishment means. 7
Retributivism has also been increasingly seen as being limited
practically. One major example is that by describing deserved
punishment in terms of justice, scholars and practitioners have made
deserved punishment seemingly resistant to fiscal considerations. 8
But it turns out, unsurprisingly, that punishment is a serious financial
drain on state and federal budgets, so prudent legislators and citizens
are now saying that punishment needs to be looked at pragmatically
and not as a matter of punishing offenders come what may. This is a
serious, indeed monumental, 9 shift in the politics of punishment on
the ground, and unfortunately retributivists have little to say
about it. 10

6. A particularly good statement of this problem is in Hugo Adam Bedau, A
Retributive Theory of the Pardoning Power?, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 185, 198 (1993), who calls
defining proportionality the “very heart of darkness” for the retributivist. For an extensive
discussion of the problem, see MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN, THE IMMORALITY OF
PUNISHMENT (2011). In his introduction to RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST, DOES IT HAVE A
FUTURE?, Michael Tonry notes the problem, but does not (to my mind) appreciate its depth.
See Tonry, RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST, supra note 2, at 1 (expressing frustration at recent
retributivist thought to say anything meaningful about proportionality).
7. I have been guilty of punting in the past. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders,
Bentham on Stilts: The Limited Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 907, 951–52 (2010) (rejecting the insistence that retribution answer questions of
proportionality, and saying that such questions are institutional, not conceptual).
8. For a sensitive examination of this problem, but with (in my opinion) a less than
satisfactory answer, see Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 815 (2007).
9. Especially given that it has meant conservatives are now mobilizing against long
(and expensive) sentences. For an excellent survey of this development, see David Dagan &
Steven M. Teles, The Conservative War on Prisons, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 25,
25–31. For more on the role of cost in criminal justice more generally, see Chad Flanders, Cost
as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri’s Experiment, 77 MO. L. REV. 391 (2012).
10. See my discussion infra Part III.
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In my essay, I try to diagnose in what ways traditional
retributivism has gotten things wrong and how to fix them. In truth,
the solution may be to largely abandon retribution as a theory of
punishment. 11 What retributivism gets right is that there should be
some constraints on how and why punishment is implemented. We
should not punish the innocent. We should not, as a rough matter,
punish less severe crimes more harshly than how we punish more
severe crimes. These two features of retribution—call them the
innocence constraint and the proportionality constraint—are two
things that retribution has gotten right. But retribution goes wrong
when it translates these features into insights on the aims of
punishment generally instead of limiting them to how punishment
should be distributed. Retribution goes wrong when it endeavors in
the first instance to explain why people deserve punishment. In fact,
deterrence theory is largely right that people should be punished
because it improves the safety of society, and for no other reason. If
retributive theory is to find its proper place, it will be as part of an
overall theory that takes deterrence as the ultimate justifying aim of
punishment, not one that begins and ends with retributive
considerations.
The consequences of the retributive mistake have been
unfortunate both in theory and practice. By seeking out a theory of
desert, retributive theory has spent time explaining how punishment
might be a good thing, for both those being punished and for the
rest of society, beyond the fact that punishment might increase
society’s safety. This idea, that punishment is an intrinsic good, is not
only fruitless, it is harmful because it encourages the notion that
those who are punished benefit somehow from their punishment, so
that if we failed to punish them, we would be hurting them by
violating their right to be punished. 12 This rather strange notion has
its roots in Kant and Hegel, and makes little sense considered

11. But, as I go on to note, this does not mean abandoning certain norms usually
associated with retribution. The problem comes in thinking that only if we adopt retribution as
a theory can we endorse those norms.
12. Alice Ristroph has emphasized this point in her recent work. Alice Ristroph, Respect
and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601 (2009). However, Ristroph seems
to me to take her point too far, into a generalized skepticism about state authority, a skepticism
which I reject. See Flanders, supra note 3, at 133–37 (contrasting Hobbes and Smith on the
legitimacy of state punishment). On the “right to be punished,” see John Deigh, On the Right
to Be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 ETHICS 191, 195–97 (1984).
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outside of their metaphysics, yet it persists in modern philosophical
writing about punishment.
Moreover, by focusing on the intrinsic benefit of punishment,
retributivists have seemed to shift their focus away from the practical
problems of crime and punishment: how to reduce crime by
preventing it from happening, how to improve the lives of those in
prison, how to ease the reentry of prisoners back into society. These
are irrelevant to the question of what justifies punishment in the way
retributivism often conceives of it. This focus on punishment may in
some sense be excused as methodological: retributivists are interested
just in justifying the act of punishment and nothing else. But
punishment is just one part of a complex network of criminal justice,
and the focus on one part of that network at the expense of others
(which is what retributivists do) can result in a distorted picture of
crime and punishment. There is some exciting empirical work being
done on stopping crime and reducing punishment, which
retributivism takes very little account of, if at all. 13
Retributivism, I conclude, risks ringing false when it stops merely
being a theory of some rational constraints on punishment and
instead turns into a theory of why we have punishment at all: it
makes what should be at the outer bounds of a theory of
punishment into its core. For the fact is, we have punishment in
order to make society safer by controlling crime, and not primarily to
give people what they deserve. 14 To be sure, not every kind of
punishment should be tolerated in pursuit of this goal, and this is
where retributivist constraints on punishment can be both necessary
and helpful, by providing the outer framing of the pursuit of our
criminal justice goals. But retributivism goes wrong when it presents
itself as an independent good, something we should seek out for its
own sake. Everything that is valuable about retribution as a full-

13. See, inter alia, DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT! ONE MAN, A STREET
FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) (describing the
author’s experience with various crime-reducing programs); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN
BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009) (providing
empirical studies and theoretical analysis of what reduces crime).
14. Here I follow H.L.A. Hart in his analysis of the “justifying ground” of punishment.
See H.L.A. Hart, A Prolegomena to the Principles of Punishment, in Tonry, WHY PUNISH?,
supra note 3, at 195–205.
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blown theory of punishment can be reformulated into retribution as
a theory of side constraints on punishment. 15
My essay divides into three major parts, each developing a part of
the critique of retributivism. In the first part, I look at the substance
of some of the major historical and contemporary theories of
retribution: Kant and Hegel on the one hand (historical), and
Herbert Morris and Jean Hampton on the other (contemporary).
Kant and Hegel’s theories either rely on barely comprehensible, and
probably false, metaphysics, while Morris and Hampton’s theories—
while dispensing with the dubious metaphysics—only obliquely
touch facts about real people. The problem with both types of
retribution (the historical and the contemporary) turns out to be
similar: retributivists take an important point about the limits of
punishment—that it should not be imposed on the innocent and
should not be grossly disproportionate to the crime—as an insight
into the purpose of punishment. But Rawls and Hart, in remarkably
similar essays published at roughly the same time, 16 had it right: the
overall purpose of punishment should be utilitarian, not retributive.
The second part of my essay attacks the intuition that grounds
much sophisticated retributive thought: the idea that people deserve
punishment for their crimes. What is this notion of desert? Using
insights from John Rawls’s work on distributive justice, I question
whether we have any firm grasp on the idea of preinstitutional
retributive desert. Indeed, the inability of retributivists to say
anything meaningful about proportionality shows the truth of this
insight. We have no grasp on what a “proper” punishment would be
because the idea of determinate desert prior to institutions that can
give desert a shape and meaning is incoherent. If we insist, contrary
to Rawls, that we do have a concrete idea of desert prior to
institutions, either this idea of desert cannot give us meaningful
guidance when it comes to sentencing, or it relies on a set of
metaphysical beliefs that should not ground a political conception of
justice.
The final part focuses on the practical failings of retributive
theory. When we look to retribution for solutions or even
suggestions on what to do about criminal justice in our present

15. For the idea of “side constraints” on action, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
16. See infra note 79.
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condition, we either find that retributivism is virtually silent, or it
points us in the wrong direction. With cost containment, retribution
says cost is irrelevant and we should ignore it. With mandatory
minimums, retribution says we should work to make all sentences
mandatory. On the death penalty, retribution gives a strong
justification for it, despite recent (heroic, but misguided) efforts by
retributivists to assert the contrary. Finally, with the phenomena of
mass incarceration, retribution says that it is justified if the
punishments were deserved, which is simply to deny that mass
incarceration itself is a problem at all.
My conclusion touches on the old question of whether
retribution is just a stand-in for revenge. 17 I conclude that it is not,
or at least not entirely, but rather that retribution and revenge share
a very important characteristic, which makes them both
inappropriate to be taken seriously as theories of punishment: they
isolate themselves from consideration of consequences, and any
purposes other than the “intrinsic” good of punishment itself—a
good which, if it exists, is no good at all.
II. RETRIBUTIVISM: A CRITIQUE OF THE MAJOR THEORIES
A. Kant and Hegel
The hero and godfather of retributivists is surely Immanuel
Kant. 18 Although he is widely cited, or at least parts of him, Kant’s
philosophy is little understood and perhaps for good reason. Kant’s
major discussion of retribution in his Metaphysics of Morals includes
some passages that are hard to understand outside of Kant’s
sometimes extravagant and dubious metaphysics. Indeed, few accept
all of what Kant says in these passages, though many think that there
are still ideas worth salvaging in his work, if only we are careful. But
it remains to be seen whether these “good” ideas can be separated
from Kant’s larger metaphysical beliefs, and even if they can be,
whether they are plausible ideas taken by themselves.
The two major ideas that modern retributivists take over from

17. For the classic rebuttal to this charge, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 366–68 (1981).
18. In referring to Kant, I will be mostly using the excerpt found in Immanuel Kant,
The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon, in Tonry, WHY PUNISH?, supra note 2, at 31–36
[hereinafter Kant, Penal Law].
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Kant are these: the idea that punishment necessarily expresses respect
for those who are punished, and second, that punishment should be
proportional to the crime. The first idea, I think, is largely mistaken.
The second idea is correct, but it turns out to be a mostly empty
idea. Modern interpreters of Kant are hard pressed to give content to
Kant’s idea of proportionality once it is divorced from Kant’s
metaphysics.
1. Respect
Start with the idea that punishment expresses respect for those
who commit crimes. According to Kant’s conception of the social
contract, anyone who wills a crime, also wills that he be punished—
he has done the crime to himself. 19 To fail to punish the person who
commits the crime, then, is to fail to treat him as a willing subject in
his own right, to fail to respect his choices. It is to treat him instead,
perhaps, as someone who is to be managed or controlled and not as
a person. 20 That, for Kant, is almost the paradigm case of disrespect,
and any self-respecting person will accordingly want to be
punished. 21 Hegel, in this seemed to be substantially in accord with
Kant. Indeed, he seemed to pick up Kant’s idea and run with it. To
not punish a person who had done wrong would be to dishonor
him, Hegel said; punishing is a way of “honoring” the choosing
subject. 22
This idea has some intuitive appeal. If we do not hold someone
responsible for their actions, and instead say that is the result of
social factors beyond their control, we may diminish them as
persons. C.S. Lewis gave great rhetorical support to this idea in his

19. Id. at 32 (“Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among
the people is one that you do to yourself.”).
20. Id. at 31–32 (stating that a person can only be punished “on the ground that he has
committed a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the
purposes of someone else and can never be confused with the objects of the Law of things.”).
21. See, e.g., id. at 33 (expressing that a man of honor would choose to be punished
according to his desert, even if this meant death). Hegel would later pick up and run with this
idea. See G. W. F. Hegel, Wrong [Das Unrecht], in Tonry, supra note 2, at 45–46 (“In so far as
the punishment which [the act of the criminal] entails is seen as embodying the criminal’s own
right, the criminal is honoured as a rational being.–He is denied this honour if the concept and
criterion of his punishment are not derived form his own act; and he is also denied it if he is
regarded simply as a harmful animal which must be rendered harmless, or punishment with a
view to deterring or reforming him.”).
22. See G.W.F. Hegel, Wrong [Das Unrecht], in Tonry, supra note 2, at 45–46.
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classic essay on the humanitarian theory of punishment: treating
someone as not responsible for his actions because he couldn’t really
control himself can be insulting; it is as if we see him more as a child
than as an adult human being. 23
But we need to question each part of Kant’s analysis. Initially, is
it true that a person who chooses to commit a crime chooses to be
punished? As an empirical matter, this is certainly not true: those
who commit crimes by and large do not want to be punished, they
want to commit a crime and they want to get away with it. They do
not want to suffer the consequences of their criminal act. They want
to enjoy the benefit of the laws, without having to pay the price
when they break those laws. Kant thought that no one would object
to being sentenced to death for murder, and that people would
laugh at anyone condemned to death said he was being punished too
harshly; 24 in that, we can see, he was clearly wrong. 25
Of course, Kant was not simply making a descriptive claim.
Rather, his point was that as a transcendent matter when people
choose to commit a crime they are in fact choosing to be punished.
And so, even if they do not actually want to be punished, they are
committed transcendentally to willing their punishment. 26 So we
respect people when we punish them, even if their empirical wills are
suggesting (pleading?) that they would rather not want this form of
“respect.” We respect criminals by taking their actions seriously, as
acts of responsible agents and not of children or animals or robots
who could not have known better or who could not have done
otherwise. Kant’s version of this argument requires a lot of
suppositions about the original social contract, but we can put those
to one side. 27 Most contemporary defenders of Kant do not appeal,

23. See C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in Tonry, supra note 2, at
91.
24. Kant, Penal Law, supra note 18, at 34.
25. Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy,
35 POL. THEORY 175–99 (2007) (arguing that, on a contractualist theory, people would not
consent to the death penalty).
26. Id. at 35 (“When, therefore, I enact a penal law against myself as a criminal it is the
pure juridical legislative reason (homo noumenon) in me that submits itself to the penal law as a
person capable of committing a crime, that is, as another person (homo phaenomenon) along
with all the others in the civil union who submit themselves to this law.”).
27. Id. Kant imagined that we “transcendentally” agreed to a contract where, if we were
to commit a crime, we consent to being punished. See Immanuel Kant, Theory and Practice
Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory but Does Not Apply in Practice, in
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explicitly anyway, to them: they reject the idea that we are literally
honoring people’s choices by punishing them. 28 Instead, they focus
on the idea that punishment is a way of showing respect for people:
by taking their choices seriously, as choices of responsible agents.
I am suspicious of this form of “respect.” For one thing, it does
not seem true that we respect people only by punishing them. For
example, we could try to rehabilitate or even forgive them. 29 Both of
these methods of responding to a crime do not seem to diminish our
respect for that person qua person, or treat them merely as products
of social forces. Indeed, both rely on treating that person as a person
either by encouraging him to see the wrongness of his ways
(forgiveness) or helping him change into a better person
(rehabilitation). It seems cruel and wrong to think that the only way
(or the best way) of relating to a person who has done wrong is
punishing him. Even the idea that therapy shows lack of respect for a
person seems hopelessly outdated: the remnants of a culture that was
fearful of psychological explanations of human behavior, fearful that
it would simply show us as a product of dark, unconscious drives. 30
Therapy now seems positively humanistic in contrast to the nowdominant biological (and reductive) understandings of human nature.
In short, there are many ways to treat a person as a responsible
agent, and only a narrow set of them involves actually punishing the
person, by subjecting them to either physical or psychological
suffering. Think of the different ways we hold others responsible for
doing something wrong in our daily lives. We hold others
responsible by criticizing them, shaming them, expressing
disappointment in them, rebuking them, shunning them,
badmouthing them, yelling at them. All of these acts presuppose that
a person has done something wrong, and that this wrongdoing
requires censure. But they all stop short—some very far short—of
punishment. Even the plausible, lesser claim by Kant, which is not
that we will our punishment but that we ought to be taken seriously

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 421–22 (Carl J. Friedrich trans., 1949).
28. Most contemporary Kantians reject the idea of a transcendental contract, but hold
on to the idea of a “hypothetical contract.” The question still remains, however, whether such
a contract is binding. On this latter question, see Dan Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral
Force, 10 LAW & PHIL. 235 (1991).
29. See Deigh, supra note 12.
30. See, e.g., C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in Tonry, supra note
2, at 91 (expressing distress about treating crime as a “disease” and needing to be cured).
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as responsible agents when we do wrong, does not give us an
argument for punishing people.
But there is in fact another flaw in the idea that punishment is
the only way to show respect, one relating to the moment the person
chooses to disobey the law. Kantian respect-as-punishment seems to
rely on the idea that those who commit crimes are fully autonomous
when they choose their crime, and they express their full, true selves
in choosing. This also seems to be empirically incorrect, and not
many would hold to the idea that those who grow up in rotten social
circumstances have full autonomy, and fully choose their crimes.
Kant of course felt otherwise: his view of the will was that no matter
our empirical circumstances we can rise above them, and choose the
right path. 31 This is our transcendental or noumenal freedom, which
we always retain, even in the most trying of circumstances. Social
psychology has shown this type of freedom—freedom from any and
all circumstances—to be simply nonexistent. A lot depends on group
dynamics, or how we frame the situation, not on our
transcendental freedom. 32
Now, consider: does it diminish our respect for a person if we
show the victim has had a history of abuse in his family, or that he
has brain damage, or that he has been addicted to drugs? It would
diminish respect for him only if we saw a fundamental incompatibility
between sympathy and respect such that acknowledging difficult
social circumstances or mental or psychological difficulties meant no
longer relating to a person as a person. 33 But there seems no
necessary conflict between these two points of view. At the very least,

31. Kant held that it was always possible that we act in accord with the dictates of
morality. See, e.g., KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 5:30 (Mary McGregor trans.,
1996) (“Ask [someone] whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of . . . immediate execution,
that he give false testimony against an honourable man who the prince would like to destroy
under a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life. . . . He
would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without
hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something
because he is aware that he ought to do it and recognizes freedom within him, which, without
the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.”) (emphasis added).
32. This has been the upshot of much work in behavioral psychology. See generally
JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR (2005); LEE
ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed, 2011)
33. For a sensitive reflection on the relationship between knowing the details of a
person’s past and still respecting him or her as a person, see Martha Nussbaum, Equity and
Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993).
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we might acknowledge that not all crimes are the result of fully
aware, fully informed, fully controlled choice, and that this should
make a difference as to whether punishment shows respect for a
person’s choices. 34
A large amount of the rhetorical strength of the Kantian view
involves contrasting it with a deterrence based view: if we punish
only to scare people, or to threaten them with terrible consequences
if they commit a crime, then this treats people as means rather than
as ends. We treat them as dogs, as Hegel famously said. 35 But in fact,
this strikes me as eminently debatable. Certain threats require
treating people as autonomous, choosing agents, who understand
the consequences of their actions and can be expected to alter their
behavior accordingly. Nor does it seem incompatible with respect to
punish someone if this is necessary for the safety of the community,
or to set an example for others. It would be wrong to punish
someone only for these goals and not because he had committed an
offense. But this is a side constraint on deterrence, not a replacement
of deterrence with some other (retributive) goal. 36
A final point on respect: whatever the merits of the idea of
transcendental respect by punishing someone who has committed a
crime, it may still be the case that the actual conditions of American
prisons and jails mean that those who are incarcerated there are not
being treated with respect. 37 Respect suggests some constraints on
how we treat people, and not merely that we treat them as
responsible agents. Unless it is any punishment that will show
respect (and I am doubtful that modern Kantians believe this;
certainly Kant thought there were limits to how harsh and disgusting
punishments can be 38), there may be some punishments that fail to

34. It seems to me a fairly common feature of modern life that we ascribe some things
in a person’s behavior to chemical or psychological factors without at the same time absolving
them from all responsibility or thinking that they are no longer “persons.” Note that the
question of whether people with bad social backgrounds or psychological disorders should be
punished is a separate question than whether punishing them is always necessary in order to
respect a person, when he or she has committed a crime.
35. See ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL’S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION 168 (1997) (using
deterrence to justify punishment is like threatening a dog with caning).
36. For an excellent development of this point, see Zach Hoskins, Deterrent Punishment
and Respect for Persons, 8 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 396 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (illustrating conditions in
California prisons).
38. See the discussion of Kant on rape, infra at note 18.
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show respect to prisoners, because they are cruel, or demeaning, or
inhumane. Such may be the reality of many prisons and jails in America.39
Of course, the Kantian may respond that this is an argument to
reform prisons and jails; indeed, I have suggested this argument in
the past, in a retributive spirit. 40 But this supposes that such an
argument can be made from within Kantian philosophy; that Kant
can give us a sound argument—one which modern Kantians can
adopt and adapt—that some conditions are disproportionate to the
crime that has been committed, so that we can say some
punishments are in fact disproportionate. This is an argument at
bottom about proportionality, which I turn to next.
2. Proportionality
Kant’s argument that punishment is a gesture of respect is, I
think, ultimately wrongheaded and should be rejected. It is not a bar
to treating people with respect to have an institution of punishment
that works primarily to reform them, or to deter others from
committing similar crimes (or even to have no institution of
punishment at all). But Kant’s claim about respect was linked to
another one, which some have also found persuasive. Kant says that
those who commit a crime will their punishment upon themselves,
but this begs the question: how much should they be punished? And
Kant’s answer is exactly to the extent that they broke the law. For Kant,
this was the old doctrine of jus talionis, or an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth. 41
Kant again reinterpreted the doctrine, rather brilliantly, in terms
of the criminal as willing his punishment. A person who commits a
crime not only wills that he be punished, but also that his
punishment be the very crime he committed. He has agreed to this,
again, transcendentally speaking. Kant’s best example is the death
39. This is yet another way in which Kant’s theory may be better considered a theory
for the ideal world, and not for our real world.
40. Flanders, Retribution and Reform, supra note 3, at 104.
41. Kant, Penal Law, supra note 18, at 32 (“What kind and what degree of punishment
does public legal justice adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of
equality . . . that is, the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the other.
Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one you
do to yourself.”).
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penalty. A person who kills another deserves nothing less than to die,
because he has chosen it. 42 There is no possible substitute for death
as his punishment. For other crimes, however, it is harder to see how
this principle of reciprocity should work. Kant said that the thief
makes another’s property insecure, and so he should have his
property made insecure. 43 But how do we do this? Do we do it by
stealing from the thief? Or do we simply demand restitution? Kant,
somewhat convolutedly, suggested that the person who stole may be
used by the state for “convict labor”, “so he becomes a slave, either
for a certain . . . time or indefinitely, as the case may be.” 44 But it is
not obvious that slave labor is anything like a commensurate
punishment for theft.
Rape presented an even harder case for Kant, who said that to
rape the rapist would be undignified. 45 He suggested castration
instead. There are two problems with this response, however. The
first is that the idea that some punishments might be undignified is
an external constraint on lex talionis, not something that is contained
within it: the true retributivist, one might surmise, would grit his
teeth and rape the rapist, if that is what the just punishment was in
that case, given the requirements of proportional punishment.
Moreover, if Kant were consistent, he might use the same argument
against the death penalty, for killing somebody might be thought to
treat someone in an undignified way. But Kant does not make this
move, because for him, an execution is not the same as an unjustified
killing. One wonders, then, why Kant could not say the same thing
about a (judicially authorized, morally required) rape against a rapist. 46
The second point against the rape example is that castration does
not seem as proportionate as the act of rape. We could run the
argument in either direction. We could say that, because castration is
permanent, and rape is not, castration is a worse harm to the rapist
than the rape was to the victim (and certainly castration was not

42. Id. at 33 (“If . . . he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there is no
substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice.”).
43. Id. For an illuminating (but also inconclusive) discussion of this example, see David
Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1663–1665 (2010).
44. Kant, Penal Law, supra note 18, at 33.
45. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 130 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
46. But see id. (explaining that to rape the rapist would be contrary to “punitive
justice”).
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painless in Kant’s day). Or we could run the argument the other way.
Rape is psychologically and emotionally devastating in a way that
castration is not, so that the rapist actually gets less punishment than
he deserves. Which one of these views is right? More importantly,
how do we even go about answering this question (supposing we
even wanted to ask it)?
This indeterminacy gets to the core of the point about
proportionality. Proportionality in the abstract sounds desirable, a
necessary constraint on under- and (especially) over-punishment. But
unless we have a reasonable way of determining proportionality, we
are left in the lurch. Kant, as the rape example shows, was not ready
to submit the offender to the exact same punishment as the offense
he committed. In some cases, this would be simply impossible
logically, as Kant himself well knew. A person who sodomizes an
innocent, vulnerable child cannot himself be turned into a child and
then be sodomized. 47 So, there are difficulties that force us to move
away from strict proportionality and into rough commensurability:
most crimes can be punished in an equal way, consistent with lex
talionis, by putting the criminal offender in prison or fining him.
Hegel conceded the problem but then tried to finesse it: fines and
imprisonment do not have the “specific external shape” of, say, theft
or robbery, but they are “comparable,” and it is a matter “for the
understanding to seek an approximate equivalence in this
common value.” 48
Hegel seemed to assume that fines and prison were the place to
look for an “approximate value” in punishing crimes; Kant suggested
something similar. 49 But Hegel’s move here is questionable. Why is
time behind bars viewed as the common denominator in
punishment? 50 Because it is the most often used in advanced,
Western democracies? But this simply assumes, uncritically, that
Western democracies have discovered the correct kind of
punishment. We should ask for a deeper, conceptual explanation.

47. Id.
48. G.W.F. Hegel, Wrong, in Tonry, WHY PUNISH, HOW MUCH?, supra note 2, at 47–
48. See also KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 43, at 130 (punishments should be
in accord with the spirit, and not necessarily the letter, of the crime).
49. Kant, Penal Law, supra note 18, at 33 (person guilty of theft should be put to work
by the state “for a certain period of time”).
50. Why not whips of a lash?
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We can imagine some explanatory possibilities. Is imprisonment
usually the most appropriate form of punishment because it is the
closest to getting at what is wrong with most crimes, namely a
deprivation of liberty? This has been a regular answer, ever since it
was defended by Hebert Morris in his classic essay on “Persons and
Punishment.” 51 But we might wonder whether deprivation of liberty
is the chief wrong done by criminals, the one thing about crime that
deserves a response from the state. One might think that the essence
of the wrong done is not merely a loss of liberty, but the horror of
being a victim of a crime (the wrongness of rape is not the
wrongness of being constrained, but something much deeper and
more wounding to the individual’s dignity; the wrongness of rape is
different from the wrongness of kidnapping, or even the wrongness
of an assault). There is more—much more—normative work to be
done here.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that imprisonment is our best
approximation to a “common denominator” in punishment. Still,
there are problems with the very idea of measuring the severity of
punishments along any denominator once we abandon a strict lex
talionis approach, as do almost all modern commentators (including
Kant). 52 There are two steps we need to take in matching crimes
with punishments.
The first step is to scale crimes in terms of their badness. This is
difficult, if not impossible. We might think that an unjustified killing
is the worst crime, and the more unjustified the killing, the worse the
crime. But this ignores how some killings that are motivated by racial
or ethnic hatred might be worse than other killings, so that two
killings motivated by racism might be worse than two killings done
for money (or for honor, or for some other, more seemingly
respectable motivation). Or it might be that killing a police officer
(or the president, etc.) is worse than killing an ordinary civilian. And
certainly, after we move beyond causing a death without justification
as the worst crime, we are in very amorphous territory: Is an armed
home robbery worse than a wounding? Is kidnapping worse than
rape? Is picking a pocket worse than shoplifting? On and on it can
go, down the line. Is there any principled way we can say that some

51. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY & MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, 31, 36 (1976).
52. KANT, supra note 45, at 130.
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crimes really are worse than others? Perhaps there is, but I have yet
to find it. The fact that we might make some, localized comparisons
(stealing $50 is worse than stealing $25) should not blind us to the
fact that we have no global scale on which to rank crimes.
Even assuming there is a principled way to scale crimes in terms
of their badness, there are problems. Assume for the sake of
argument that we have a rough ranking of the badness of crimes,
with murder at the top and then rape, then assault, then robbery,
and so on down the line. How do we determine how many years
each of these crimes should receive? This may have a deceptively
obvious answer (one which many have given), that the worst crime
should get the most years (or death) and the less serious crimes
should get successively fewer years, until we get to probation or to a
fine for the least bad crime that we continue to call a “crime” (rather
than an “infraction”). But then we have to determine, first, the top
end of the scale, and second, the intervals between punishments for
crimes. 53 We could fix the top end at death, but then how far down
do we go to the next punishment? Do we fix intervals at one, five, or
ten years (or days)? How do we decide how finely grained the scale
of punishments should be? No matter that we don’t know even how
to determine what is in the universe of available punishments in the
first place. 54
Consider an example. In Norway, a mass murderer was
sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. 55 Many were outraged, and
said so at the time, but how do we know that this punishment is
retributively unjust? If we believe in the death penalty, then we may
have our answer: he should be put to death. But take the death
penalty off the table (or if you want to leave it on the table, imagine
another crime, such as a violent rape, for which one would not
deserve the death penalty under lex talionis). If the killer deserves
more than twenty-one years, how do we know this? What is it about
his crime that makes it a matter of retributive justice that he serve

53. See also Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD.: INT’L J.
289, 308 (1996).
54. For example, is death a permissible punishment? Is torture?
55. Laura Smith-Spark, Norway Killer Anders Breivik Ruled Sane, Given 21-Year Prison
Term,
CNN.COM
(Aug.
24,
2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/24/world/europe/norway-breivik-trial.
Breivik
killed
seventy-seven people. His sentence is subject to extension at the end of the 21 year term.

FOR PHIL. ANALYTIC TRADITION

326

DO NOT DELETE

309

4/14/2014 11:21 AM

Can Retributivism Be Saved?

any time in prison at all, let alone twenty-one years? Why not simply
public shaming?
If we say, in response, that public outrage, or public sentiment
more generally, should determine the appropriate level of
punishment, 56 then retribution emerges as something nearly empty
philosophically speaking, a theory that can give us no critical
perspective on how much punishment a given crime should receive. 57
The same also applies if we say that the right punishment is up to the
discretion of the judge because we do not know how to determine
what limits the judge should work within. In short, retribution
promises a proportionality constraint, but it gives us no resources to
see how that constraint might yield not just a determinate result but
any result, even a range of results. This has to be considered a
serious, indeed almost devastating, failure of retributivism. It says we
should punish, but it cannot say how much we should punish: even
worse, it cannot even provide a principled way we would go about
discovering the answer to the “how much” question.
B. The Modern Retributivists: Morris, Hampton
Two of the most interesting and colorful, and indeed most
compelling, philosophical theories of punishment in the twentieth
century have both been retributivist. They take their inspiration from
Kant and his retributive theory. They, like Kant, express a concern
for respect and equality. But where Kant speaks in lofty and
transcendental terms, they seek to interpret retribution in slightly
more real-world terms. Herbert Morris puts retribution in terms of a
binding contract that we enter into with others of our society: when
we violate those terms we owe it to society to “pay back our debt.”
Jean Hampton develops her retributive theory as one that involves
giving an expression of respect to the victim of a crime to “balance
out” the contempt that the criminal has shown her or him.
With Kant, I developed my criticism of him on a largely
theoretical basis. I questioned whether punishment was necessary for
56. In recent years, Paul Robinson has been the most vocal and consistent advocate of
this approach. See his classic essay with John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453 (1997) (arguing that sentences should be assigned based on a community’s perception of
“just deserts”). At the very least, the critical potential of such an account depends on the
(possibly shifting) perceptions of the community as to what is “just.”
57. If we rely on public opinion to determine sentences, then we are subject to changes
in those opinions: they may be quite harsh at one time, and lenient at the other.
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showing respect to an offender and his choices. I also wondered
whether he could follow through on his claim that retribution could
specify “proportionality in punishment” in any meaningful sense.
Here I proceed a little differently. I think that Morris and
Hampton’s theories are much more attractive, metaphysically
speaking, than Kant’s, although I suspect they do not escape the
theoretical difficulties that bedeviled Kant. But this is not my main
concern here. Rather, I proceed against Morris and Hampton by
noting the serious practical difficulties their theories encounter.
1. Herbert Morris
Herbert Morris was certainly one of the most influential, if not
the most imaginative, retributivists of the twentieth century. For
Morris, the controlling metaphor for punishment is quite literally
paying back a debt that we owe. Society for Morris is a contract we
make with others: we obey the laws, and in exchange for that, we get
the benefit of living in a society where the rule of law is enforced.
When we break the law, this bargain is shattered, but not irrevocably.
If we pay an extra burden back to society, then we can regain the
equilibrium that our crime has disrupted. In a word, it is tit for tat. 58
Accordingly, when we break the law, we have to pay society back,
and not because of societal stability or some other good. We can
imagine that society could survive a certain number of crimes that go
unpunished (indeed, it almost certainly does). But that does not
remove the unfair advantage that those who commit the crimes have
over the rest of society. They get to commit their crime, and in so
doing they do not follow the constraints society has laid down on
everyone. Punishment’s purpose is to rather forcefully put those
constraints back on those who have recklessly cast them off. 59
In an admiring but critical essay, Jeffrie Murphy criticized
Morris’s theory in a way that has, to my mind, never been
sufficiently rebutted. 60 The premise of Morris’s theory is that we all
start out roughly equal. Indeed, Morris explicitly said so in his
essay. 61 But this is obviously not true. 62 We do not all get the same

58. Morris, supra note 51, at 33.
59. Id. at 34–36.
60. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in Tonry, WHY PUNISH, HOW
MUCH?, supra note 2, at 127.
61. Morris supposes that men are “roughly equal in strength and abilities.” Morris,
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benefits out of society. Murphy cast his objection in strictly Marxist
terms, by thinking of the inequality that mattered as inequality of
resources. 63 For some, society provides them with lots of resources
and the law protects those resources. Others have little or nothing
and their material and social deprivations prevent them from getting
more. Those on the losing end of the societal bargain do not start
out on equal terms with the rest of society, so when they commit a
crime and are punished, that punishment is not returning society to
an ex ante state of equality. It is simply reasserting the earlier,
unequal state. In short, if the opening conditions of society are not
fair, punishment isn’t fair, because it isn’t restoring an initially fair
starting point. The person who was never given anything by society
to start with doesn’t “owe” it anything.
But we can make a claim against Morris that is broader than
simply the Marxist one about economic inequality; it is in this form
that the argument is at its most persuasive because it avoids the
Marxism of Murphy. For Morris might respond that even if there is
inequality of resources and social conditions, there is still a rough
legal equality—equality of the protections of the law against
violations of property, person, and life. We are all equally “formal”
citizens before the law: we are protected by the rule of law, especially
when it comes to the criminal law, even if the rule of law sometimes
perpetuates and deepens real, actual, material inequality. This
objection seems especially compelling against Shawn Bayern’s
reformulation of Murphy’s argument: Bayern emphasizes the private
burdens that people may individually suffer in society and argues that
Morris’s argument fails to take these private burdens into account. 64
But if the criminal law protects everybody, Morris can still say that at
least our protections under the law are equal, whatever our other
private burdens and disadvantages might be.
But it seems patently untrue that the law is enforced equally. In
America, the law that protects people against acts of violence or theft
is not enforced and implemented in a fair or impartial way such that

supra note 51, at 33.
62. Murphy, supra note 60, at 130.
63. Id. at 144. This simplifies Murphy’s brilliant and sophisticated article to a great
degree; still, I think I get at the most important aspect of it.
64. Shawn Bayern, The Significance of Private Burden and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play
Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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all equally benefit from the law. 65 The poor and African Americans
simply do not receive as much in the way of legal justice as rich and
white people do. 66 In fact, many times, they are victims of the unfair
enforcement of the law. To say that the poor and African Americans
have gotten a “fair deal” by the law as it is actually enforced is by and
large empirically false. 67 To rephrase it in Morris’s terms: for many in
society, the “social contract” is a bad deal because it is unequally
enforced against them, and indeed ends up being a tool of
maintaining social inequality rather than correcting it.
All of this is to say that Morris’s retributivism does not describe
modern society, and its unequal enforcement of the laws. Morris
might admit that if society does not fit his description, then society
should not endorse retributivism as a theory of punishment, at least
not yet. His theory, in short, becomes an ideal theory of
punishment. We should work towards social and legal equality
(although perhaps for reasons other than that such equality would
make retributive justice possible), but until we get there, Morris’s
theory does not pull much weight. Murphy reinterpreted Morris as
offering just such an ideal theory, and it explains why Murphy was
able to hold on to Morris’s theory for as long as he did. 68 Some do
not interpret Morris this way, however, and assert it is a suitable
justification for punishment in the status quo. I think this is wrong,
unrealistic, and harmful. I think that the most we can say about
Morris’s theory is that it is a theory for a society very far from our
own, one that we may never reach. 69 Something similar holds for
Jean Hampton’s theory of retribution.
2. Jean Hampton
If Morris gives Kant’s ideas content by relying on a “bargain”
between those in society, Hampton instead refers to the esteem or
respect that is promised—and guaranteed—by a liberal society to its
65. See, e.g., JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER, THE POOR GET PRISON (8th
ed. 2006) (documenting the many ways the criminal justice system is biased against the poor).
66. See the especially powerful indictment of the American criminal justice system in
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
67. See id.
68. Murphy, supra note 60, at 130 (calling for a restricting of society in order to
“render punishment permissible”).
69. There is a problem with construing the theory even this way, as I explain infra.
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members. When a person commits a crime, that person announces to
the victim by his or her actions that he or she is “better” than the
victim: that he or she gets to do something to the victim, without the
victim being able to respond. 70 Note that the offender doesn’t have
to lord it over the victim; rather, the crime itself expresses the
message of superiority. What punishment does, then, is restore the
balance of esteem in a liberal society: the criminal needs to be made
low and brought down from his previous “high” of superiority over
his victim. 71 The criminal deserves his punishment as a way of
balancing out the distribution of benefits and burdens, but a way of
canceling out the bad message promoted by the criminal.
By putting things in terms of esteem or respect, Hampton avoids
at least one aspect of the main objection to Morris, which is that he
ignores the existing inequality of benefits and burdens in society. If
punishment is designed to “balance out” resources, and the existing
balance is already inequitable, then punishment cannot restore a
balance; it will only perpetuate an unbalanced state of affairs.
Esteem, or respect, does not work the same way. Respect is not a
finite resource. A just state can and should show respect to
everybody, by punishing people for the wrongs that they have done.
But the same implausibility that doomed Morris’s argument also
looms large for Hampton. If we say that punishment is necessary to
show respect to the victim of the crime, don’t we also need to take
into account the preexisting distribution of respect and esteem in
society (something that is probably not exogenous to the
distribution of wealth and other resources)? And here we find a
situation that is perhaps even worse than the material and legal case.
Is the person who is poor and underprivileged, who commits a theft,
or even a violent crime, in a position of overall superiority to the
victim of that crime? It is hard to say, at least in the abstract. But the
fact that it is an open question (at the very least) shows the difficulty
of saying in the abstract that all crimes are crimes in which a criminal
asserts his or her superiority, rather than need or desperation or
frustration, in committing the crime.

70. See generally MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 5, at 115.
71. Id. at 134 (“The higher wrongdoers believe themselves to be (and thus the more
grievously they wrong others), the harder and farther they must fall if the moral reality of the
parties’ relative value is to be properly represented.”).
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Again, we have to descend from the abstractions of an imagined
just legal system and look at the reality of crime and justice in
America and elsewhere. In a system that works in some areas, but
not at all in others, where the rules are sometimes enforced fairly, but
often are not, it is hard to say that the enforcement of the laws will
always reassert the balance of respect. Moreover, in a system where it
is hard to say that some crimes express anything at all, we cannot say
simply as a general matter that crimes are ways of some people
lording it over other people. Is the juvenile who robs a store out of
pressure from members of a gang, and who does it not to gain
money, but simply to gain acceptance and a measure of economic
security, expressing his superiority over the storekeeper? He may feel
a shiver of domination as he holds the gun in front of him, but this
cannot be an overall judgment of what he is doing and his situation.
For his situation is, overall, a matter of oppression more than
domination. He may be dominated by his peers, or by society at
large; he may have had a poor to nonexistent education; he may have
few opportunities for meaningful employment; he may get little or
no support from his family and friends. 72 This is not to say that the
storeowner who is robbed is in any greater position of superiority, or
that a failure of the law to respond at all would not diminish his
moral standing in the eyes of the community. 73 But this may show
even further the folly of trying to conceive of the criminal law as a
mechanism of upholding the respect people are owed; respect is a
complex and fluid phenomenon, and it is hard to say who has more
or less, or how in any given situation we can distribute it more evenly.
In short, when the juvenile who sticks up a store is punished, is
the law canceling out his domination, or is it simply dominating him
even more? The juvenile could well see it that way. That the odds
were stacked against him, and now they are even more stacked
against him: he may face time in prison, and then a wrecked path out
of prison. We might imagine ideally, that the law would punish those
who commit crimes of domination, and reassert the power of society
to cancel out that domination. But things in the real world are rarely

72. See, e.g., CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS 12–13 (2001) (noting the “profound
sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in
black America”).
73. That is to say, there must be some response of society to the wrong, but how great
this response should be, and what should motivate it, are further questions.
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that simple. The social meaning of any given criminal act cannot be
distilled into a clear message of “I’m better than you,” rather than “I
have no other choices in my life but to do this sort of thing,” or “I
don’t want to do this but I feel trapped,” or “This is all I can do to
feel like a person.” Nor can the message of incarceration be
translated into a sign of reducing the offender’s expressive advantage
over society, as opposed to being interpreted as another (unfair, and
disproportionate) way in which society shows its advantage over
those who are poor or disaffected, or both. Is the person punished in
this way restored to his original position, or his he made even lower?
The answer, it seems to me, is obvious, especially given the wellknown difficulties prisoners have in reentering society.
Hampton’s retributive theory, like Morris’s, attempts to explain
why it is that offenders deserve punishment. It is a positive theory
because it doesn’t just say that we shouldn’t punish those who
haven’t committed a crime, but that we have a duty to punish those
who commit crimes. Morris says we should punish because we need
to balance out an unjust state of affairs. Hampton says we have to
reset the economy of esteem, so that the high are brought low, and
the low lifted up. While they are both well-intentioned, they are too
abstract, and they imagine an equality of resources, or of esteem,
that simply doesn’t exist in any present-day society. 74
III. DOING WITHOUT DESERT 75
Part II canvassed some major theories of retributive justice: the
classic theories of Kant and Hegel and the more modern theories of
Morris and Hampton. 76 I think that when we consider the theories,
and how they spell out their notion of retributive justice, there is
much left wanting: for Kant and Hegel, the idea of proportionality
cannot be fully cashed out (despite the vague assurance that it can be

74. But see Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 59 UCLA L. REV, 1659, 1699 (1992) (“So of course there is a problem in
punishing the inner city teenager given this theory of retribution-but that is a strength of the
theory, because punishing such a person is problematic.”).
75. I borrow this title from an essay by Erin Kelly, with which I am in considerable
agreement. Erin Kelly, Doing Without Desert, 83 PAC. PHIL. Q. 180 (2002).
76. There are other retributive theories, of course; but I have confined myself to the
ones I consider the most foundational and the most recently influential. There is also some
question in my mind whether all theories that bear the label of “retributive” are really
retributive, or borrow more from other theories. I hope to address this point in future work.
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cashed out); the ideas of Morris and Hampton have more (or
perhaps further) troubles with application. They (Morris and
Hampton) seem to dream of a world of equal resources, or of equal
esteem, that is far from actually existing. But there persists a
stubborn intuition that criminals deserve their punishment—in other
words, that bad things should happen to bad people. 77 Even if we
cannot say how this punishment should be measured, whether
according to lex talionis or in terms of years or something else, or if
we are not yet at a place of equality where that punishment can be
given fairly or justly, the intuition remains that those who do wrong
deserve state punishment of some kind, no matter what the social
conditions. So long as we hang onto this intuition in some form, the
retributive idea will still remain with us; we will be unwilling to sign
on to the program that says punishment is first and foremost about
crime control and not about giving people what they deserve, which
is at best a secondary and derivative concern.
So we need to get rid of the supposed primacy of this intuition,
at least for the purposes of punishment. When we do so, we will find
that punishment theory becomes much more open to the real world,
and it ceases to be cut off from other aspects of the criminal justice
system, such as defining what crimes there are, or what procedures
should exist to safeguard the rights of the accused, or even measures
to alleviate poverty. In short, when we give up an obsessive focus on
desert, we are able to take a much more holistic attitude towards the
problem of punishment and will cease to see it as a “discrete”
problem at all. This, as it were, is the prize for abandoning the
notion that in political society, prisoners deserve their punishment,
and the point of the institution of punishment is to give people what
they deserve.
Because the idea of desert in criminal punishment goes so deep,
and is so pervasive, it requires an attack on three levels. First, I will
attempt a direct attack that the idea of desert has any role to play in
criminal justice apart from setting up certain side constraints on
punishment. The problem comes when we turn the eminently
reasonable and acceptable idea that punishment must have
constraints into an end in itself and we start entertaining ideas of
fundamental desert. The first step in getting over this misconception
77. With apologies to HAROLD S. KUSHNER, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD
PEOPLE (2004).
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is to diagnos the root of the idea, to explain how it arose in thinking
about punishment.
My second attack is more basic and more wide-ranging, and that
is to question the idea of pre-institutional desert itself, or the idea
that we can be said to deserve anything in political society before we
have set up the institutions of political society in the first place. The
philosopher John Rawls is famous for making this attack against
ideas of pre-institutional distributive justice, but the point has been
less common in discussions of pre-institutional retributive justice.
There are intuitive reasons why this argument should also apply in
the retributive justice debate as well. The idea that desert only
emerges after we have decided on the basic institutions of society
further underscores the point that desert is at best a derivative
consideration in designing and implementing institutions of
criminal justice.
The third attack considers what remains after the first two attacks
have been completed. It says, insofar as there remains any other idea
of desert, any other idea that we may merit reward or punishment,
praise or blame for our actions, that idea is properly considered only
outside of politics, and not in the design of our political institutions.
It would be foolish to deny that there may be ideas of religious
desert, or some such thing, so that the wicked deserve to be in hell
and the saintly deserve to be in heaven. But such a conception would
surely be ill-suited for politics. The same holds for any other idea of
desert that treats “desert” as a fundamental concept. One can feel
guilty and the need to atone, but these are in the end private feelings
that are at best secondary to the state’s purposes in punishing. These
feelings are matters, to put it again in Rawlsian terms, of one’s own
comprehensive doctrine; 78 your bad feelings about yourself or about
others cannot be the basis of a properly political conception.
This is the preview of my attack on desert; now, on to the attack.
A. Desert as Misunderstood Side Constraint
In one of the more striking instances of great minds converging,
both John Rawls and H.L.A. Hart had similar insights on the nature
of punishment and on the roles that utilitarian and retributive ideas

78. The idea of a comprehensive doctrine was developed in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1992).
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play in the justification of punishment. 79 The state of the argument
prior to Rawls and Hart was a stalemate: neither utilitarians nor
retributivists were able to persuade the other that their justification
was the one that best captured the true justification for punishment.
Retributivists insisted that any theory that could countenance the
punishment of the innocent—as they claimed utilitarianism could
and would do—was wrongheaded and evil. Utilitarianism responded
that retributivism would allow punishment that served no purpose—
executing last murderer on the island—and so was really, at bottom,
a form of revenge: why have people suffer for no good reason? The
debate between these two isms is a staple of introductory philosophy
classes, and of first year criminal law courses.80
What Hart and Rawls both saw was that the debate, if considered
as a debate where one must choose one theory over the other and
only one theory could not be solved, and shouldn’t be—or at least
not on those terms. Both theories contain an element of the truth
and both have some fundamental failures. Utilitarianism, without a
retributive constraint, is blind to the possibility that it could justify
punishing the innocent, or punishing someone without end, if either
of these things are necessary for deterrence or the safety of the
community more generally. Many utilitarians admit this failure,
which is why many utilitarians adopt a side constraint against
punishing the innocent. But such a constraint seems rather ad hoc.
Retributivism as well has its failing, chief among them is that
retributivism, without any utilitarian aim, is empty: empty of a
satisfying reason or any reason at all why punishment was necessary
or fitting for a wrong done. Many retributive theories, if only
implicitly, acknowledge this failure of retribution by “stuffing” their
retributive theories with intrinsic goals that are quasi-utilitarian at
bottom: such as ensuring democratic self-defense, or promoting
equality before the law, or reforming the offender by
“communicating” the state’s disapproval of his conduct. 81

79. See Hart, supra note 15, at 195; John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3
(1955), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 20, 23 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
80. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 1.
81. These are all goals that Markel has said, at one point or another, his retributive
theory embodies. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 7, at 938. It seems that many of these
ideas can be fully accommodated by a consequentialist theory, especially the need for selfdefense, and even the idea of communication, which could be part of a suitably fleshed-out
idea of specific deterrence (those offenders who internalize the right values are less likely to
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Hart and Rawls saw that neither theory could do well on its
own, because both are right, but at different levels of understanding
criminal punishment. 82 The utilitarians are right that the reason we
have punishment at all, why it is necessary for society, is that we need
to ensure the safety of communities, to control crime. If we had no
need for this, then the institution of punishment, established and
enforced by states, would have no sensible raison d’être. There
would be no reason for a society on its own to set up punishment
just so it could punish the guilty if that had no relationship to some
other, deeper, utilitarian purpose like maintaining order or
preventing private acts of vengeance. Nor is it clear that an
institution of punishment could exist for very long if it fulfilled none
of these utilitarian purposes or worked in a way contrary to them.
Whatever the origins of punishment (if it began, say, to
institutionalize private acts of revenge), the function of punishment
in the modern, bureaucratic state is crime control.
But this is not the end of the story. We may agree that the reason
we have the institution of punishment is to control crime, but this
fact doesn’t dictate how the institution should be run, once we have
it up and running. And it is at the level of running the institution
that retributivism comes into play, not in explaining why we punish,
but in dictating how we should punish. This insight was the great
innovation of Hart and Rawls. We punish people in general because
this keeps society safe, but we have rules about what merits
punishment. For instance, one can be punished only when he has
committed a crime, and he can be punished only proportionally to
his wrong. These are retributive rules about punishment. They do
not derive from utilitarian reasons, or at least, they do not derive
obviously from utilitarianism. They are (more or less) independent
rules about when and how we can punish people. We might wonder
why we have these rules, whether they reflect concerns about human
dignity, or about fair notice, or something else. 83 But Hart and

offend again). I deal with the idea of equality before the law in the conclusion to this essay.
82. For a longer look at Rawls and Hart in the context of debates about cost and
sentencing, see Flanders, supra note 9.
83. Hart grounded the prohibition against punishing the innocent on legality principles,
not directly on desert-based ideas. See Hart, A Prolegomena to Punishment in TONRY, WHY
PUNISH?, supra note 2, at 200 (retribution is distinct from the “simple insistence that only
those who have broken the law—and voluntarily broken it—may be punished”). We might also
have a prohibition against “excessive” punishment without this being founded on anything
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Rawls say that we best understand these rules as coming in at the
level of operation, and not at the level of the justification of the
institution as a whole. We don’t need to be retributivists all the way
down to see that retributivism had some good ideas about when we
shouldn’t punish.
But for Hart and Rawls, we make a basic mistake when we take
the retributive constraints on punishing (don’t punish the innocent,
don’t punish excessively) as the reason why we punish in the first
place. To do this is to turn those constraints inside-out, to make them
do work that it is not appropriate for them to do: to place on
retributive constraints the burden of justifying the institution of
punishment as a whole. It would be like saying the reasons we have
government is so that we can have Fourth Amendment constraints on
the power of the government. But this gets things exactly backwards.
We have the Fourth Amendment, among others, to constrain the
power of government, and government exists for reasons and purposes
other than what the Fourth Amendment aims to protect. The
retributivists make the mistake of turning something that restricts
punishment into something that explains why we have punishment.
Of course, retributivists might ask: why do we have this
constraint? Don’t we need a notion of desert to show why we don’t
punish the innocent? But this supposes that only the notion of desert
can do this work, and not anything else. And this supposes, in turn,
that we can make sense of desert as a stand-alone idea. But what
does it mean to say not just that the innocent shouldn’t be punished,
but that the guilty actually deserve their punishment? Does desert, in
short, exist?
B. Does Desert Exist? 84
My argument in the previous section was, in part, both
genealogical and descriptive. I wanted to explain how we might get
our intuitions about desert in the first place. We may be tempted to
desert-based: just an intuition that some punishment is just more than we can or should stand,
or that is incompatible with human dignity (one might object to the death penalty or torture
on this ground). Of course, a punishment can also be excessive on deterrence grounds, when
the punishment is greater than that which is necessary to optimally deter. For another attempt
to justify proportionality outside of punishment theory, see Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a
Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263 (2005).
84. Here I summarize an argument I make at length in Chad Flanders, Punishment and
Political Philosophy: The Case of John Rawls (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

338

DO NOT DELETE

309

4/14/2014 11:21 AM

Can Retributivism Be Saved?

think that the norm of not punishing the innocent exists as part of a
larger principle that says we ought to punish the guilty. But as I
suggested above, we don’t need to think of desert in this way.
Instead, we can look at desert not as an independent principle
governing punishment, but rather as a short-hand way of thinking
about certain side constraints on punishment, i.e., don’t punish the
guilty, don’t punish disproportionately, punish like cases alike, etc.
The goal of punishment is still utilitarian, but it has side constraints.
We make a basic mistake when we turn what are really constraints
into stand-alone principles.
But we can also levy an even stronger claim against the
retributivist. For he has not just made a mistake in thinking that what
are constraints on punishment provide the fundamental reason for
punishment. In fact, he has settled on a concept—the concept of
desert—which is, at the end of the day, empty. We cannot give any
meaningful content to desert, because desert in the sense the
retributivist needs it to exist, does not exist.
We have already seen one aspect of this puzzle in our discussion
of Kant. There, we asked how we decide what proportionality in
punishment requires. How many years is “fitting punishment” for a
rapist? For a kidnapper? Once we get away from a strict lex talionis
approach to proportionality, all we have are our intuitions, and our
intuitions have precious little to go on. In fact, our intuitions tend to
“anchor” in our culture, finding what is the conventional
punishment to be the “appropriate” punishment in that case. 85 But
we have little reason to trust that our culture has magically hit on the
exact right number of years for punishment, any more than presentday Norway has, or for that matter, China in the 1500s.
There is an easy explanation for this puzzlement when it comes
to retributive proportionality, and it is this: desert does not exist as
an independent concept. If we ask, in a vacuum, what people
deserve, we have a hard time coming up with a determinate answer.
The questions get harder to answer once we get more specific: what
does a battered wife who kills deserve? What does an armed robber
who is a juvenile deserve? Does anyone deserve the death penalty?
The questions are hard here, but their difficulty derives from an
even more fundamental problem, which is the absence of any
85. For a discussion of “anchoring” in the context of sentencing, see Stephanos Bibas,
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2515–16 (2004).
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guidelines about the concept desert itself.
The best argument against desert comes from Rawls again, but
this time from his later, more mature work, A Theory of Justice. 86
Rawls made the argument about desert in the context of distributive
justice, but we can easily transpose it into the key of retributive
justice as, indeed, many have. 87 Rawls can be read in a radical way, as
to say that there is no such thing as an “independent” concept of
desert. Or it can be read in a less radical way, as to say that desert is a
concept not appropriate for a modern, political society such as ours.
Both arguments are, I think, devastating to the concept of desert. I
consider the first one in this section; I consider the second one in the
next. Even if we don’t find the first version of the argument
persuasive, the second one is really all that we need to do away with
desert as an independent concept.
Begin with Rawls on distributive justice. Rawls says that one
principle we might think of when it comes to desert is this: give
resources to those who deserve them, who score high on some
metric of merit, or worth, or deservingness. We look at how hard
people work, or what they produce, or how good of people they are,
and then reward them accordingly. Rawls says that to do this is
impossible. Why?
One way Rawls is commonly read is that no one can deserve
anything because we don’t deserve our talents. 88 Even our ability to
work hard is not our doing; it is something we were born with, or
were lucky enough to acquire. Because we don’t deserve our talents,
we can’t be said to deserve anything that flows from those talents.
This is certainly one way to read Rawls, and it is supported in some
parts by the text; I do not think it is the only way (although it seems
to me the impulse behind this reading is one worth investigating).
In this way of reading Rawls, he is a skeptic about our ability to
deserve anything, because we—as individual humans—don’t have
the proper “desert basis” to do so. To properly deserve anything,
we would have to be responsible all the way down for being who we
were, for creating ourselves almost. 89 But no one creates themselves;
86. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
87. See especially the discussion in Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal
Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 965 (2000).
88. A reading given forcefully in MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 34 (1992).
89. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) for this argument.
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we need society, we need our genes, and we can’t be said to have
created those things about us. On this line of reasoning, we can’t be
justly punished, because we aren’t responsible for being who we are.
Again, some have read Rawls this way, but I don’t think it is the
only way to read him. Consider a more “institutionalist” reading. 90
Read in this way, Rawls says that how we deserve something does
not exist apart from the institutions of society. We can only say that
we deserve something if we know the scheme or structure we are
working with: desert is a measurement that does not exist prior to
society; it exists after society and is used for the purposes of that
society. To take an example from Rawls’s earlier essay, “Two
Concepts of Rules,” we only know who deserves to win a baseball
game once we know what the rules of the game are. 91 We can only
say that someone deserves something after we know what the rules
of the game are. Similarly, it is only after we have set up the basic
institutions of society that desert exists as a meaningful concept at
all. The question of who deserves to win the game of baseball
doesn’t get any traction until we actually have an institution called
“baseball,” and certain skills, talents, and results become salient.
The same applies to other institutions of society. How much
money should doctors earn? What about firemen? Should we pay
public school teachers more? 92 How do we determine these things?
Well, we need to know what system we are working with; we need to
know the rules of the game. Once we have established this, we can
go on to say what doctors should earn, but not before then. Because
it turns out there is no fact of the matter about what doctors ought
to earn prior to us knowing what, in fact, society is for and what the
rules of society are in order to achieve the goals of society. What
people “deserve” will be different depending on what the
organization of that society is, what principles it is run by, and what
those principles say about desert.
For Rawls, society should be organized around the difference
principle: differences in the distribution of resources should be made
in order to help the least well off. 93 How much people ought to earn

90. See Scheffler, supra note 87.
91. RAWLS, supra note 79.
92. For a perceptive discussion of these issues (focusing on desert in distributive justice),
see MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? (2009).
93. RAWLS, supra note 79.
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depends on what the principles of justice say about how society
should be organized. Until we know what those principles are, we
simply don’t know what people deserve. To borrow from Samuel
Scheffler, there doesn’t exist anything like “prejusticial desert.” 94
Desert is a concept that we derive from justice; it has no independent
moral force, because whatever moral force it does have comes from
the principles of justice by which we define what desert is in the
first place.
The same argument applies, if we make some adjustments, to
punishment. 95 How much time do rapists and murderers deserve?
What crimes should be punished by prison, and what by probation?
What crimes should even be considered crimes? We can’t say what
the answers to these questions are, either, until we have set up the
institution of punishment, and know what the goals of punishment
are. But this means that desert can’t be understood as a concept
prior to the institution of punishment: we can’t know what we ought
to punish, and for how long, until we have certain institutions set
up. This is not the same as the more skeptical reading of Rawls
which says that no one deep down has the capacity to deserve
anything, because no one is responsible for all he or she is. Rather on
this less skeptical reading, people do deserve things (and, in a sense,
they “really” deserve them to the extent that anyone can deserve
anything). But they deserve things only after we have decided what
the rules of the game are.
Now, there will be constraints on awarding desert or meting out
punishment. There are constraints in Rawlsian distributive justice,
after all. We do not use the difference principle in all areas of life: we
don’t let it rule over individual decisions, for instance, or require
families to distribute resources according to it. 96 The difference
principle is the rule that organized the basic structure of society, and
there can be other rules that limit how the difference principle
operates. The same goes for punishment, too. We have the basic
institution, set up for a particular purpose or purposes, and then we
put constraints on how we can achieve those purposes.

94. See Scheffler, supra note 87.
95. See Douglas Husak, Holistic Retributivism, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2000), for
similar arguments.
96. The limitations of the difference principle are examined—and critiqued—by G. A.
Cohen in G. A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008).
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Rawls insists in A Theory of Justice, somewhat confusingly, that
retributive justice should not be thought of in the same terms as
distributive justice, suggesting perhaps that pre-institutional desert
belongs in the former, but not the later, area. 97 Rawls seems to think
that our pre-institutional instincts about punishment are stronger
than our pre-institutional instincts about desert. But his remarks on
this point are less than clear. It is true that retributive and
distributive justice have different goals. This of course is obvious: the
goal of a scheme of distributive justice is to encourage people to
work and to make sure that all inequalities of resources go to the
least well off. It would be bizarre if this were the goal of a system of
punishment! A system of punishment, rather, tries to discourage
crime and protect society, within fair limits (fair notice must be
given, the innocent should not be punished). But setting apart the
obvious difference in goals, the structure of the two institutions is
the same, and so is the place of desert within them. Desert arises as a
meaningful term only once we know what the rules of the game are.
In other words, people “deserve” their punishment because the
institutions of society say they do, not because there is some preinstitutional notion of desert that the institutions of society
somehow have to live up to.
C. Desert in Comprehensive Doctrines
But this may seem to move too quickly and require qualification
because surely we have some idea of pre-institutional desert. We have
this in both the distributive and the retributive context. We have
some idea that good acts should be rewarded and bad acts should be
punished, independent from any institutional context. Institutions,
some might object, really do exist to give shape and form to these
intuitions, not the other way around; it is not as if the institutions
create these intuitions of desert, which we then follow. Rather, we
have the intuitions first, even if they are inchoate, and hard to define.
When children see bad things happening, they sense that wrongs
should not go unanswered, that bad men should not be allowed to
get away with doing bad. 98 Similarly, when we see someone do a
97. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 314–15; see also Flanders, supra note 84.
98. Here I am indebted to unpublished work by Thomas Simon on the nature of our
“brute” emotions. See Thomas Simon, Injustice Emotions (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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good act, we want to benefit that person: we instinctively want to
praise her. These are not feelings created by institutions; they are, as
it were, part of human nature. Our intuitions are responding to these
feelings. Moreover, we use these intuitions to critique existing
institutions; when people get more or less than what we think they
deserve, we balk.
I think this is probably true, even undeniable, but it does not, or
does not necessarily, affect the earlier point. For example, consider
the wide distance between our simple (“brute”) intuitions of praise
and blame, and the actual institutions of distributive and retributive
justice. We again, of course, face the problem of indeterminacy in
reward and punishment. How much should the good person gain
from his good act? How much should the bad person suffer in
proportion to his wicked act? The idea that there is some preinstitutional, and yet firm, idea of praise and blame that can give us
determinate answers to these questions seems to me to be farfetched. So even if we agree that we have these feelings, we still need
institutions to give a shape to them, to give them form
and precision.
Further, there is still a long way between the fact that we have
these feelings of praise and blame and the point that it is the purpose
of political institutions to give expression to these feelings. There is a
gap here, which we have to take account of, and notice. We might
get mad or upset at all sorts of things, but we do not think they
should be punished, or, that they should be punished by the state. At
the very least, we need an argument as to why some things should be
punished and for how long, and we can’t make this argument just in
terms of our brute feelings.
We can make this point in terms of what Rawls would later call
“political liberalism.” 99 Rawls says, rightly, that modern society is
characterized by deep conflicts over ways of looking at the world,
what he calls “comprehensive doctrines.” 100 Some look at the world
religiously; others don’t. Some subscribe to an ethics of absolute
duty; some are pragmatists. If we tried to convince one another
about these doctrines, we would be bound to fail. The arguments, at
the very least, would stretch out interminably as we would be

99. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7878. Jeffrie Murphy explores a similar
line of thought in JEFFRIE MURPHY, PUNISHMENT & THE MORAL EMOTIONS 64–93 (2012).
100. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 12.
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starting from different places, with different experiences, and
different values. We’d never get to an agreement.
But still, we have to live with one another, so we find a way to
agree on political matters, matters that do not rely on our
“comprehensive doctrines.” To take one example: some may think
that there are religious wrongs, that some things offend God, and
that they should be punished. But others may disagree. They may
think that God is not so easily offended, or they might think that
there is no God. There is probably no way of successfully settling this
debate. So we try to put it off the table. We try to say, instead, let us
talk about things we can all agree should be punished, that don’t
depend on one’s belief in God, or in any particular “comprehensive
doctrine.”
I think the idea that there is a pre-institutional notion of desert is
an example of an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine. People will, it
seems fair to say, disagree fundamentally about desert. Some will
deny there is such a thing: Rawls, read one way, does precisely this.
He says (as interpreted by some) that we are not responsible for
anything because we are not responsible for our genes or our parents
or where we were born. Some will affirm that there is such a thing as
desert, but still say that people need material preconditions before
they are properly held responsible for anything. 101 Some will say that
people always have the freedom to rise above whatever material
circumstances they face, and to do the right thing and refrain from
criminal activity. Still others will deny the existence of free will. These
are debates that are about pre-institutional, or pre-political, desert,
about what we might be said to deserve, before there is any society,
or apart from any societal constraints. They involve what are
quintessentially metaphysical matters, about the nature of persons,
and their relationship to society. They are debates that are likely to
be interminable. They qualify (if anything qualifies) as debates we
would want to keep “off the table” if we are trying to figure out how
to govern ourselves, how to live together. 102 We would want to keep
that debate metaphysically simple. We would want to have a debate
about the shape of the intuition of punishment, about what

101. As Murphy suggested in his critique of Morris. See Murphy, supra note 60.
102. See also the similar argument made by Jeffrie Murphy in Jeffrie Murphy, Retribution
and the State’s Interest in Punishment, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 156–64 ( J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
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punishment is for, that does not depend on deciding deep questions
of responsibility and desert. 103
So we might agree that there is something like pre-institutional
desert, some first or original principles of merit and demerit before
we enter into society, but whatever that idea is, whatever shape it
might take (determinate or indeterminate, religious or secular,
Kantian or Marxist), it cannot be used as the basis of political society.
When it comes to politics, we have to look for rules that we can all
agree on about the aims and purposes of punishment.
This debate, I think, will look a lot like the one Rawls and Hart
described in their early essays. We will look at punishment as a matter
of crime control first and foremost, which is precisely why we would
need an institution like punishment. 104 It would also include a
discussion of side constraints, about not punishing the innocent. But
the debate about side constraints would need to be (at best)
incompletely theorized. 105 We would not want to rely on a deep
theory about why we should not punish the innocent and punish
only the guilty. We should give notice, we should punish fairly, and
we should not punish excessively. All of these requirements can and
should be separated from the idea that we should punish people
because they deserve it in some pre-institutional sense.
Those who wanted to make the argument that their brute
feelings demand justice would need to make a political argument
about why the institution of punishment should correspond to their
feelings. Their feelings alone are not sufficient, publicly acceptable
grounds for punishment. Thus, when Michael Moore writes that he
would feel so guilty he would want to die if he had committed a
murder, this is not an argument that he should be punished. 106 It is
simply a report of his feelings. Even group feelings are not a political
argument. This is not to say that they cannot be made into one, but
as they stand, they do not rise to that level.
103. This does not mean that there are no ways in which parts of retributivism may be
part of a properly political conception. Mostly, I am doubtful that any notion of desert can
properly be called “political.”
104. We should not, however, “beg the institution” of punishment. What we need is
crime control: whether criminal punishment is the best way to achieve this end is an open
question. For an analysis of this question, see DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT
(2008) (advocating the abolition of prison).
105. See CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING & POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
106. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 145 (1997) (stating that if he had killed a 23year-old woman, he “would feel guilty unto death”).
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So does pre-institutional desert exist? It may, but if it does, it is
not a suitable ground for designing institutions of punishment. For
one, it is too indeterminate: we cannot get specifics about what to
punish, and how, from intuitions about bad acts. For another, preinstitutional desert does not give us the right kind of reasons for
building and maintaining just institutions.
IV. RETRIBUTIVE THEORY IN PRACTICE
Traditional versions of retribution fail as a matter of a theory. In
its “popular” theoretical forms, the ones familiar from first-year
criminal law classes and given sophisticated shape say, in Kant or
Hegel’s philosophy, or in Morris and Hampton’s modern-day
updates, retribution doesn’t work. Retribution doesn’t work because
when we try to spell it out, we either get incoherence and
indeterminacy, or worse we get a type of unworldliness and unreality:
a society in which the laws are enforced equally, or that people start
out on a level playing field, which crimes upsets and punishment
restores. But the problems go even deeper. The very idea that
anchors retribution, the idea that gives it its moral force and power,
the idea that we deserve punishment when we have done wrong, is
either empty, waiting for content from utilitarian norms, or at best
an idea beset by controversy, and inappropriate for political debate.
For in political debate we need consensus, we need agreement, and
we can’t get this with as fuzzy a notion as desert.
In the retributive picture of the world, people freely commit
crimes, and they subsequently deserve punishment. Punishment
shows respect for those who are punished, it shows them that they
are taken seriously, that their actions have not gone unnoticed, that
(in a slightly perverse way) the community cares about them. If
society did not care for the criminal, they would treat the criminal,
or try to threaten him or her, or worse, ignore him or her.
Punishment demonstrates that the criminal and his acts matter.
Society on the retributive picture is by and large fair (in the
metaphor of Morris, a fair bargain), either as a matter of empirical
fact, or as a kind of transcendental truth. Crime damages that
fairness: someone is getting away with something at the expense of
all of us. We, as a community, have to react to this harm against us,
not merely the physical harm that, say, murder or assault or robbery
or rape represents, but the moral and political harm that the criminal
act represents. The punishment symbolically negates that harm, by
347
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either forcibly resetting the balance of benefits and burdens (Morris)
or correcting the false message the criminal presents by his crime
(Hampton).
This is a vision of the world that is stirring, almost ennobling,
certainly inspiring, and possibly even aspirational (when charitably
read). It helps that some of the writers in the retributive tradition are
brilliant prose stylists. Their writing moves. In fact, it is almost
tempting to read some modern retributivists, such as Morris and
Hampton, as pointing to ideals of punishment. We may not be able
to punish, justifiably, on their theories now, but someday (when
things are more equal) we might be able to. But even this seems a
little strange. We should not try to inhabit an ideal world because
that would enable us to punish more justly; an ideal world is a
worthy goal in its own right (if anything is). 107 Nor does it answer
the pressing question, what do we do in the meantime about crime
and punishment? 108
On this last and most vital of questions, I maintain that the
retributive theory has little to say: it is too caught up in ideals and
abstractions. And when it does have something to say, traditional
retributivism leads us in the wrong direction. Retribution faces
practical as well as theoretical difficulties.
A. Retribution as Limited in Practice
Consider four areas of criminal justice that are among the most
hotly debated today, and that will be exemplary for my purposes. In
these three areas, retribution either has nothing to say, what it says is
useless, or what it says is positively harmful.
1. Cost containment
Amazingly, we have reached a point in American criminal justice
where there is actually positive legislative pressure against building
more prisons and increasing sentences for criminal offenders. 109 One
would have thought that this might have never come to pass. There
has traditionally been considerable political upside to being tough on
107. Cf. Murphy, supra note 60, at 144 (changing “basic social relations” the key to just
punishment).
108. I discuss the gap between the ideal and the real at greater length in my Pardons and
the Theory of the “Second Best,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 1559 (2013).
109. See Dagan & Teles, supra note 9.
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crime. And conversely, one gains little by being seen as sympathetic
to prisoner’s rights or to the rights of criminals. Moreover, prisoners
have no organized lobby, save some civil rights groups and the
members of the prisoner’s families. The prison industry (public and
private), however, does have considerable lobbying force, and has an
interest in filling beds and building prisons. 110 Moreover, criminal
punishments may tend to ratchet “up” over time, as long sentences
become the new baseline, and the new outrageous crime needs to be
more than the current baseline. 111
But the recent financial crisis has proven to be a strong enough
counter-trend to this “natural” state of affairs. Prisons and prisoners
cost money to house and feed. Guards and new buildings are
expensive. So something amazing has happened: conservatives,
previously “tough on crime” have now become, in the current
phrase, “smart” on crime. 112 They have realized that many states
cannot afford to spend more on criminal justice, or at least on
criminal punishment. They are looking at alternatives to prison: they
are looking to probation, to treatment, and to decriminalization.
Can retributivism say anything about this issue? Not really, at
least historically. Or if it does say something it says that this move to
controlling costs is mistaken. Punishment is a matter of justice, Kant
says in several places, as do many contemporary retributivists. We
should not change or alter the proper punishment for someone
because we need to save money, or because an alternative is cheaper.
The murderer must be executed, even if there is no social purpose
provided by the execution, or even if leaving him in exile would be
cheaper. This harshness is part of the legacy of Kant on punishment.
Some retributivists have tried to make retribution more “real
world” by saying that giving people what they deserve is only one
factor among many that judges and legislators have to weigh, that
retributive punishment is not an absolute duty, but a good among

110. Charles Blow, Op-Ed., Plantations, Prisons, and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012,
at A21 (“[O]n almost a daily basis, local prison officials are on the phones bartering for
prisoners with overcrowded jails in the big cities.”).
111. See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
609, 631 (2006).
112. See, e.g., Statement of Principles, RIGHTONCRIME.COM, available at
http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (describing the “conservative case” for reforming prisons and jails).
See also supra note 9.
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other goods. 113 But how should we weigh this good compared to
other goods, how do we manage the trade-off? How do you weigh
the justice of a punishment, the necessity of punishing evil, with
other factors, such as saving money? Traditional retributivists would
say you can’t: justice can’t be “balanced off” against other factors,
without missing the point of what justice is. Contemporary
retributivists give us no guidance as to how we should balance off
retributive justice and why we would ever want to. 114 Retribution
here mimics the problems with absolute rights (rights as
“trumps”) 115 in other areas. It gives, at best, no guidance and at
worst guidance of the wrong sort by saying that we should simply
ignore cost, as if this were possible in the real world.
2. Mass incarceration
The term “mass incarceration” has now become familiar in
penological discourse. 116 The statistics are also drearily and
depressingly familiar. Several numbers stand out: the percentage of
adult Americans (and especially African-Americans) in prison, and
the sheer number of Americans in prison compared to the rest of the
world. 117 What does this phenomenon mean about America and
what should be done about it? Like the problem of prison costs
spiraling out of control, many remedies have been talked about, and
floated. 118 But most importantly, mass incarceration is now treated as
a problem in itself, over and above other problems with the
administration and functioning or criminal justice. 119

113. See Cahill, supra note 8, at 866–67 (author’s approach “does not view desert as a
fundamental ex ante obligation (or restraint), but rather as one good to be balanced against
other possible goods in determining whether punishments appropriate in a specific case”).
114. A point I make in more detail in Flanders, In Defense of Punishment Theory, and
Contra Stephen, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 243 (2012).
115. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) (defending notion of
“rights as trumps”); see also Shafer-Landau, supra note 53, at 306 (strong retributive theory
“forbids any cost-benefit calculations in the creation or application of sentencing guidelines”).
116. See ALEXANDER, supra note 66.
117. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72
(describing the rise of mass incarceration in America).
118. See, e.g., Carol Steiker, Mass Imprisonment: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies,
9 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 1 (2011).
119. Dorothy Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
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Can retributivism even recognize mass incarceration as a
problem? I am not sure it can. To do so, it would have to be more
specific about particular sentences and why they are unjust; it would
have to say more about what kinds of things should be punished. If
we leave these questions to elected legislatures, then we risk getting
no critical purchase on the problem of mass incarceration because
the problem is by and large a democratically created one. Or if we
leave the problem of long sentences open because we cannot say
what proportionality requires, then we cannot criticize some
sentences as excessive, at least not without any precision. Nor does
retribution as a theory of punishment have anything to say about
overcriminalization, a phenomenon that is, for obvious reasons,
closely related to mass incarceration.
But if we are worried about the social and economic costs of
punishing people too long, we might see mass incarceration as a
waste of both money and lives. Or as a matter of political philosophy,
we might see mass incarceration as presenting a problem, even a
crisis, of state legitimacy. 120 Retribution is at best silent about the
problem of mass incarceration, or says: if prisoners are justly in
prison, then mass incarceration is required as a matter of justice.
There can be no “further” problem of the large number of people
behind bars on the retributive way of looking at things.
3. Mandatory minimums
Not unrelated to the previous problems is the existence of
mandatory minimums—that is, fixed minimum sentences for certain
crimes. Mandatory minimums for some nonviolent drug crimes
have been the focus for some critics, but the problems with them
can be described in general terms: mandatory minimums give
prosecutors too much power, force judges’ hands at sentencing, and
frequently result in sentences that are too long. The solution to this
is to get rid of the minimums, or lower them substantially, and give
judges more discretion in sentencing offenders.
Does retribution have anything to say about this? We might
think it does. Retribution might say that some of the minimums are
too long, and so are disproportionate, but it lacks any firm basis to
120. See in this regard, the important pieces by James Forman and Glen Loury. James
Foreman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010); LOURY,
RACE, INCARCERATION, & AMERICAN VALUES (2008).
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say so for reasons we have already canvassed. Again, retribution as a
general theory is too indeterminate on what counts as proportional
or not: it cannot say what is too long for any given crime. If the
retributivism says that, instead, we fix the minimum by asking
people what is an appropriate minimum sentence, then retribution is
openly giving up on its critical purchase. For the minimums that we
have are precisely the consequences of the “people” acting through
the legislature to fix the appropriate sentences. 121
In fact, if anything, retribution would seem to favor something
like mandatory sentencing not just for selected areas of the criminal
law, but for every area. Retribution favors a principle of equality in
sentencing, at least as a formal principle: like crimes should be
treated alike, and no differences in punishment based on the
sensibilities of the offender or on whether a longer or shorter
punishment is necessary for deterrence. By treating like offenders
alike, the retributivist treats people equally; as such, the retributivist
will tend to be against giving judges too much discretion in
punishing offenders because this leads to unequal treatment of
similarly situated offenders.
4. The death penalty
The death penalty has long been an object of contention and
criticism, 122 with some of the chief arguments defending it coming
from retributivists (Kant, again, is the main target). Where the
deterrence argument for the death penalty has seemed indeterminate
or vague or worse, retribution has seemed to be a reliable “go-to”
justification for putting people to death for their crimes. But
recently, some have maintained that retribution shows why the death
penalty is immoral. Dan Markel and Thom Brooks, for very different
reasons, have maintained that retribution positively excludes the
death penalty. Their arguments are not convincing. 123
Retributivism, at its core, says that wrongdoing deserves
punishment, and the greater the wrongdoing, the greater the
punishment. Nothing in this rules out the death penalty; indeed,

121. Paul Cassell & Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010).
122. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION (2010).
123. See generally Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2013).
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Kant thought that it was one of the clearest cases of retributivist
philosophy that murderers deserve the death penalty. This was
proportionality at its purest. And yet, Markel’s argument relies (in
part) on the idea that the death penalty offends dignity, and dignity
is a value intrinsic to retribution. 124 But Markel’s burden here is
twofold: first, to show that dignity is indeed intrinsic to retribution
rather than extrinsic, and second, to show that the type of dignity
that is intrinsic to retribution is one that rules out the death penalty.
I am not sure this can be done. If a person gets what he deserves, the
retribution is satisfied; there is nothing inherent in retribution (as
opposed to principles taken from liberal political philosophy, or
elsewhere) that says that punishment has to be done in a dignified
rather than an undignified way. Any connection between
retributivism and human dignity is, I think, a contingent one, not a
necessary one. Nor is it obvious under a retributivist paradigm that
putting someone to death for a crime is not to treat him with
dignity; Kant certainly felt otherwise. 125 Dignity, here as elsewhere, is
a stirring word that means something, but what that something is
can be notoriously hard to define.
Brooks bases his argument on the possibility of error in meting
out the death penalty. 126 To him, retribution means not punishing
the innocent, and putting the innocent to death is a mistake that we
cannot undo. But this is, at best, merely a practical argument about
how retribution rules out the death penalty; it is also a perfectly
general one, that would apply to (and thus possibly rule out) all
punishment. 127 Moreover, it assumes that, on balance, it is worse to
kill the innocent than to not kill those who deserve to be executed.
That the balancing should go like this (rather than the other way,
where not giving people what they deserve is worse than killing an
innocent person) is nowhere entailed by retributivism.

124. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 407, 466–67
(2005).
125. Kant, Penal Law, supra note 18, at 32 (death only appropriate punishment for
murder; man of “honor” would choose death rather than penal servitude).
126. Thom Brooks, Retribution & Capital Punishment, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON
THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 2, at 236–38.
127. A common rebuttal to this is that death is irrevocable, but a prison sentence is not.
For an effective response to this see MATTHEW KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (2011).
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If we want a cogent argument for abolishing the death penalty,
we should not look to retribution for it. Indeed, given how empty
retributivism is in its prescriptions, it is unclear that retribution can
rule out any mode of punishment. Why couldn’t torture be an
acceptable punishment, if it gives the guilty what they deserve? If the
retributivist cannot say what the guilty deserve, only that they
deserve punishment, the retributivist cannot give us a positive
reason to oppose torture in punishment. We have to look for that
argument elsewhere.
B. Why Retribution Fails, Practically Speaking
Why does retribution seem to say so little on so many pressing
issues of criminal justice, and when it does have something to say, it
seems to say the wrong thing? These exemplary examples represent
the general failings of retribution. I think these failings can be
attributed to two features of retribution, which we can call, for
convenience, closure and compartmentalization.
By closure, I mean that retribution, in most of its versions, gives
us a theory that is mostly detached from any empirical truths about
the world. It disdains (sometimes explicitly, as in Kant, but mostly
implicitly) any reliance on the “facts on the ground” about resource
distribution or about moral responsibility. It tends, as with Kant,
towards a reliance on transcendental truths about human beings, or
speaks in generalities about equality and dignity. It does not come to
grips with the facts on the ground about crime and punishment and
instead attempts—but largely fails—to provide an ideal theory
of punishment.
By compartmentalization, I mean that retribution focuses solely
on the moment of punishment and resists any discussion about
criminal justice in general. It sets as its task only the question of what
would justify punishment for crimes, and leaves to another day or
another theory subjects that would otherwise be essential to a
complete theory of the criminal law.
1. Closure
We can take the theories of Morris and Hampton as providing
good instances of closure to the real world. Morris and Hampton do
not consider what actually may be true of equality in the real world
(except, perhaps, by simply assuming that all people are in fact
354
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equal). Nor do they spend much time considering whether people
are responsible in the way that their theories would require. But
both of these things would seem to be essential to the plausibility of
their theories. If we are not equal in many respects, materially or
legally, or if our social conditions mean our acts do not give us an
advantage, or express our superiority, then the theories of Morris
and Hampton are prima facie implausible, however elegant and
stirring they may be qua theories.
The retributivist commitment to formal equality shows up clearly
in its support of mandatory sentencing. For retributivists, mandatory
minimums would seem not to go far enough, for there really should
be no variations in sentences for the same or similar crimes.
Discretion is the enemy of equality, which is here understood as
formal equality: treat everyone the same by punishing the same,
regardless of differences in background circumstances. Even if the
people committing the crime may be very different, their crime is the
same, and (formal) like must be punished with (formal) like. On a
purely retributive picture, it is hard to make sense of any differences
in punishments for the same crime. For on what grounds could such
variations be justified on their picture, if all that matters is the
individual’s decision to commit a certain crime? 128
Kant, at least, was more honest that his theory was not about the
empirical world. 129 For Kant, this transcendence from the empirical
was partly the point: we could still think of justice being done above
the messiness of the real world, even if this justice took place on
another plane. My sense is that most contemporary retributivists
would reject Kant’s metaphysical transcendentalism, but they do not
engage with facts about the real world in a way that such a rejection
would imply. They keep Kant’s disdain for the world while
discarding his overall world view, and end up at best with a theory
that applies only in an ideal world.
The retributive closure to empirical facts comes across clearest
when it comes to the reality that retributive justice costs money.
Retribution tends to put things in terms of justice, which by its
nature—by being an intrinsic good—resists assimilation to costbenefit analysis. How do we weigh justice against considerations of
cost? Again, we might say that the resistance to cost considerations is
128. For an excellent historical analysis of this idea of equality, see Whitman, supra note 5.
129. Supra Part I. Hegel seemed to follow Kant in this “unworldliness.”
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part of the point of traditional retributive justice: justice must be
done, even if the heavens fall, as Kant said. But this very resistance,
which some retributivists may see as a feature of their theory, is
actually a bug when it comes to the application of the theory. Either
we have to say that cost is irrelevant when it comes to punishment,
that it would be wrong even to consider the fact that criminal justice
costs money, or we simply have to reject retribution as a plausible
theory of criminal justice in the real world. 130 The former option
means just ignoring the real world, and the expenses of justice; the
latter option means leaving pure retributive theory behind.
2. Compartmentalization
The problem of closure is compounded when combined with
what we can call the problem of compartmentalization. Retribution
presents itself as a theory of punishment; no more, no less. It does
not, or does not necessarily, say what things should be crimes. It
does not say how people should be punished (this is the source of
retribution’s frustrating indeterminacy). It just says why people
should be punished: they should be punished because they deserve
it. Sometimes retributivists are explicit about the limits of their
theorizing.
A theory that limits itself like retribution does, has accordingly
limited its usefulness. It cannot have a positive theory of crime
control, because controlling crime is different than punishing crime.
Retribution kicks in only after a crime has been committed (however
we define crime, which retribution also has nothing to say about 131).
So measures to reduce crime cannot be justified on retributive
grounds. Indeed, retributive theory on its own terms doesn’t seem
even able to say why more crime is worse than less; it only says that
more crime would mean more punishment. It is even possible that a
retributive theory would lack the resources to say why a world with

130. A third option is possible, but it has so far been underspecified: that retributive
justice is a good to be maximized, but also to be balanced with other goods. See Cahill supra
note 8, at 861, 867 (“Any further exploration of just how good desert is relative to other
consequences is, again, beyond the scope of the present Article . . . .”).
131. A point I make in my response to Gray and Huber. See Chad Flanders, Can
Retributivism Be Progressive?: A Reply to Professor Gray and Jonathan Huber, 70 MD. L. REV.
166 (2010); see also Shafer-Landau, supra note 53, at 293 (“These [retributivist] views
presuppose the existence of a criminal code, rather than providing assistance in constructing
one.”).
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more crime but which always punishes that crime is intrinsically worse
than a world where crime never occurs. If punishment restores the
status quo ante—the balance of benefits and burdens, or the
economy of esteem—how are we different or worse off than before?
Similarly, retribution’s narrow focus on a justification of
punishment makes it blind to phenomena such as mass incarceration.
On a theory of retribution, provided that those punished are guilty
of some crime, that they deserve to be punished, there is no problem
in principle with mass incarceration. We need to look at each crime
and each punishment in isolation, and not as a larger social
phenomena, or as a question of political justice. If there is a just
punishment for each crime taken by itself, then the fact that a large
percentage of a nation, or even most of a nation, is incarcerated is
itself unobjectionable. Retribution can say that if some groups are
being punished more than others, this could be a problem, but
retribution by itself cannot say whether this means reducing the
punishments for that group or increasing the punishment for the
other groups. In general, retribution by itself can’t say whether we
need to “level down” or “level up.” 132
We might consider this self-limitation of retribution as having the
virtue of theoretical clarity. Indeed, it has clearly defined ambitions,
and it does not pretend to give guidance outside of those ambitions.
It gives a theory of the basis of punishment. But this presents us with
the question of whether it is fruitful to look at punishment this way,
as in a sort of vacuum, separated from empirical questions about the
world and about topics like crime prevention or the costs of
punishment. The focus on the moment of punishment distorts the
role punishment plays in a larger system of criminal justice. There is a
story we need to tell about criminal justice, and the purpose of
punishment has to fit in that story, somehow. It cannot be that we
stop our ears to what is happening in other areas of criminal justice
to focus on punishment, and say that this is necessary to understand
the justification of punishment correctly. In fact, doing so makes our
writing on punishment impractical and empty.
This isolation means, professionally, that punishment theorists do
their work apart from those who study the causes of crime and ways
of preventing crime, and even apart from those who try to determine
132. On the idea of leveling up and leveling down, see Chad Flanders, Pardons and the
Theory of the “Second-Best,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 1559 (2013).
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what things should be criminalized. This cannot be good, not as a
practical matter, and not as a theoretical matter either. Retribution,
in word, prevents us from thinking holistically about punishment,
about punishment as part of a larger system, which includes why
people become eligible for punishment, why they are punished, and
what our responsibilities are to them after punishment. Punishment
is not a discrete entity to be justified and explained in terms unique
only to it.
C. Is Retribution a Theory of Punishment at All?
Rawls and Hart, in their early essays, both suggested that to
think constructively about punishment, we need to start at the
institutional level: why would a society feel the need to punish
people? Punishment is one solution to a problem, they suggested,
and that problem is crime. The problem is not, pace the retributivist,
that the guilty need to be punished. It is not functionally useful for a
society to punish only for the sake of fulfilling some transcendental
moral balancing, 133 whether that balancing is of rights, or benefits or
burdens, or of esteem. The idea that punishment is necessary for
justice comes later, as a gloss on the institution of punishment.
Certainly, if retribution ended up creating more crime, it would not
long endure as a social institution. 134 In any event, Rawls and Hart
say it is bad now to think of retribution as being a foundational
purpose of the institution of punishment.
In part, Rawls and Hart thought this was just descriptively true.
They looked at the purposes of punishment, what was doing the
work in why we had punishment, and they saw utilitarian purposes,
not retributive ones. But the burden of Parts I and II of my essay
was to show that retribution can’t do the work expected of it as a
theory of punishment. That is, it is not just descriptively true that
retribution is not foundational to punishment but normatively true
as well. Retribution promises to tell us why people deserve to be
punished, and how much punishment they deserve. But it falters. On
its own terms, retribution cannot explain how we are to fix
punishments and crimes; it cannot, that is, say why the rapist deserves
this much punishment, and the robber that much. Even to explain
133. Hart famously referred to the “mysterious piece of moral alchemy” of many forms
of retributivism. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT & RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968).
134. A point helpfully made by Shafer-Landau, supra note 53, at 296–97.
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why people deserve their punishments, either retribution resorts to
intuition (“they just deserve it”) or makes implausible assumptions
about our social world (that we are equal in benefits and burdens, or
in esteem, or in rights and liberties) or simply smuggles in
consequentialist concerns.
What has gone wrong here? The problem is that a theory that
serves best to constrain utilitarianism is instead being offered as a
stand-alone theory. The intuition that the innocent should not be
punished is not sufficient to show that the guilty deserve to be, nor
will the intuition that insists unequal sentences are wrong necessarily
have any resources to say whether a punishment is “too much” or
“too little.” There may be things that we are entitled to as persons,
and these might be explained by retribution: that we cannot be
punished if we are innocent or that we cannot be punished unfairly.
But retribution cannot turn around and use these normative truths
about us to stand in for a theory of punishment. When it does,
things go wrong: retribution comes up with unappealing
explanations or no explanations at all.
Either retribution is not a theory of punishment, or it is a weak
one, a theory that cannot help us think meaningfully about our
criminal justice system. It is, at best, a theory of why some sentences
or some punishments are unjust. Or, more likely, it is simply a standin for other principles that should be considered not as part of a
theory of punishment, but as justified in their own right: don’t
punish the innocent, or don’t punish too harshly. These are often,
collectively, referred to as ideas of “legality,” and we can endorse
them without endorsing retribution: we can say that people ought to
be given fair notice, that they should be punished equally vis-à-vis
each other (and not against some imagined scale of punishments),
that they should have due process before they are punished, etc. We
can uphold all of these values, without pretending to build a theory
of punishment around them.
The failure of retribution qua theory comes across clearest when
we ask it to do any practical work, as we should expect any theory of
punishment worth its salt to do. The fact is, it cannot. The
“solutions” retributive theory provides are so indeterminate, so
empty, that it becomes clear that retribution as a theory is trying to
do a work it was never meant to do.
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V. CONCLUSION: REVENGE, FAIRNESS, AND DESERT
Retributivists have put much labor into refuting the idea that
retribution is the same as revenge. 135 Revenge, retributivists argue,
can be disproportionate, can focus on others instead of the offender,
and is a matter of feeling and not reason. But the fact that
retribution does not share all of the features of revenge does not
compel the conclusion that there is not at least a family resemblance
between retribution and revenge that would justify putting the two
in a similar category. For retribution and revenge do share one key,
defining trait: they tend to be justified for their own sakes (as
“intrinsic goods” as it were). Revenge needs no other warrant than
the fact that a wrong has been done to me (or my family) and it
must be responded to; to leave the wrong standing would be
shameful, or humiliating, or embarrassing. Retribution, too, rests on
nothing but itself for its warrant: at the end of the day, the wrong
must be answered. To not answer the wrong would be unjust, or not
fitting, or not fair. As Kant again so eloquently expressed, part of the
point of retribution is that no utilitarian good needs to come out of
it for it to be justified. 136 Even the last murderer on the island must
be killed, because justice demands it. Nothing more but also nothing less.
It is this shared feature that I think most people are pointing to
when they combine retribution and revenge: that purposeless
punishment is justified. To be sure, there still is at root a difference
between them: one is rooted in the desire of the individual for
satisfaction, the other in the ostensibly neutral purposes of the state.
But both revenge and retribution say that the suffering of the
offender is justified even if no good comes of it. In this respect, I
think it is fair to, if not equate the two, say that the two motivations
for punishment share something very important in common: that
suffering of another can be justified just because it is suffering (or
some other harm) and for no other reason. 137

135. I have discussed the relationship between retribution and revenge briefly in Chad
Flanders, In Defense of Punishment Theory, and Contra Stephen: A Reply to DeGirolami, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 243 (2012).
136. Kant, Penal Law, at 18.
137. Cf. Shafer-Landau on retributivism and “free-floating goods.” Shafer-Landau, supra
note 53, at 298 (retributivism allows decrease in citizen liberty in the name of the free-floating
good of meting out deserved punishment, where a “free-floating” good is one that does not
promote any particular individual’s interest).
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But this may lead to a final defense of desert as a basis for
punishment, and the suggestion that retribution may have
something right, after all. For if the retributivist will say that
punishment can be justified even if no benefit comes from it (no
deterrence, no channeling of bad emotions, no message to the public
that such behavior is not approved, etc.), then when we abandoned
desert aren’t we saying that if a punishment serves no public
purpose, then that punishment is not justified? Suppose that it would
make no difference (implausible as this may sound) if a murderer was
punished or not, that his non-punishment would never be found
out. Imagine, that is, the converse case of the innocent person being
punished, and imagine the guilty person (the rapist, the murderer,
the robber) not being punished. Wouldn’t it be unjust if such a
thing happened?
This is indeed the best case for what we can call “positive
retribution,” the idea that desert does not merely provide a side
constraint on not punishing the guilty, but pronounces a duty to
punish those who have done wrong. 138 And here, I think, the person
who believes, like Hart and Rawls, that the foundational justification
for punishment is utilitarian—crime control—must bite the bullet
and say: there is no injustice, that is, no political injustice that
happens in such a case, provided it is adequately described. The case
is adequately described if the only reason for punishing a person is
that he deserves it, on whatever theory of metaphysical desert we
prefer (whether the offender has a right to be punished, or must
have the benefit of his crime removed, or must be brought low in his
own eyes). All of these reasons are inappropriate grounds for state
punishment, because they rest on theories of desert that are not
political theories, in Rawls’s usage of that terminology.
We might be tempted to say that it would be unfair if the
murderer didn’t get punishment for his crime (even if no one found
out he wasn’t punished), but this notion of fairness is quite different
from the idea of desert. Fairness happens when you have a
punishment system in place, and gives rules on how to operate that
system. The idea that it would be unfair for us not to punish the
murderer is different from saying that desert alone gives us the
reason to punish him. Fairness doesn’t give you a reason in itself for
punishing. Fairness is a value that supervenes on a system of
138. See Cahill, supra note 8 for a sensitive development of this distinction.

361

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/14/2014 11:21 AM

2014

punishment that exists for reasons other than fairness; it does not
ground that system. It cannot.
Indeed, if we appeal to desert to ground our punishment of
individuals (and not to fairness), we are left appealing to our
personal convictions—however philosophical they may be—and so in
a very real sense we are on our own. We are trying to make the state a
vehicle for our own comprehensive doctrine. And here, again, may
be another point of resemblance between revenge and retribution.
Revenge is said to be a matter of the individual pursuing his own
ends; retribution is, by contrast, a matter for the state. But if we
interpret retribution as more than fair side constraints on
punishment, then retribution puts us back in the private realm, not
the realm of public reasons and justifications. We are back, that is, to
the pre-political. We are back to individuals pursuing their own
private ends.
When we look at retribution this way, we should have no trouble
with leaving it behind as a stand-alone theory. It is a philosophy illsuited for the modern, technical, bureaucratic state 139: one that
needs to approach crime holistically, and with sensitivity to the
empirical world, what is actually on the ground, and what actually
works in making communities safer. Moreover, we can keep what
was good with retribution, without buying into the entire package.
Indeed, it was only the thought that without retribution we would
become monsters (disproportionate punishment, punishing the
innocent), that retribution has had its staying power. But retribution,
despite its promises, never really had this power to stop us from
becoming monsters. It has always been up to us. What retribution
has sometimes prevented us from doing is dealing with our problems
practically and humanely. It has promised us much, but given
us little.

139. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2007).

362

